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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND
MICROECONOMIC THEORY
Ça¼gr¬Seda Kumru, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2006
This dissertation consists of the three independent chapters in the areas of Public Economics
and Microeconomic Theory. The rst two chapters use experimental and computational tech-
niques to address two important behavioral issues in Public Economics. In particular, the
rst chapter (with Lise Vesterlund) examines if concerns for status may help explain why
fundraisers commonly announce past contributions to future donors. To answer this question
we incorporate status concerns into the standard charitable giving model, and subsequently
test the predicted comparative statics in the laboratory. Consistent with the economic pre-
diction we nd that low-status followers are likely to mimic contributions by high-status
leaders and that this encourages high-status leaders to contribute. Contributions are there-
fore larger when individuals of high status contribute before rather than after those of low
status. The second chapter (with Athanasios C. Thanopoulos) uses computational tech-
niques to assess welfare implications of an unfunded social security system when individuals
have self-control preferences. Our computation model demonstrates that the welfare costs of
an unfunded social security system are substantially reduced when agents have self-control
preferences. However, the positive e¤ect of reducing self-control costs is not large enough
to surpass its negative e¤ect on capital accumulation. Finally, the third chapter (with Hadi
Yektas¸) of the dissertation examines an important and open mechanism design question. It
characterizes the necessary conditions of optimal auction for multiple objects when agents
are risk-averse. We show that the optimal auction is weakly e¢ cient; in the sense that each
iv
object is sold to a buyer who has high valuation for it, if such a buyer exists. The seller
perfectly insures all buyers against the risk of losing the object(s) for which they have high
valuation. While the buyers who have high valuation for both objects are compensated if
they do not win either object; the buyers who have low valuation for both objects incur a
positive payment in the same event. The objects are bundled to the same buyer if all buyers
have low valuation for both objects, thus, independent auctions are not optimal.
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1.0 THE EFFECT OF STATUS ON VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION
(WITH LISE VESTERLUND)
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Many capital campaigns are launched by the announcement of a large initial contribution
made by a well-known donor. These initial contributions often trigger contributions of others.
For example, characteristic of Brook Astors philanthropic endeavors is that others tend to
copy her contribution after news about her donation. When she gave one donation to
the New York Library, for example, three other major gifts from Bill Blass, Dorothy and
Lewis B. Cullman, and Sandra and Fred Rose all followed, with her generosity cited as the
inspiration.1
As shown by Varian [81] the classical model of voluntary contributions cannot explain
why fundraisers announce past contributions to future donors.2 A possible explanation may
be that initial contributions are used to signal the quality of the non-prot to subsequent
contributors (Vesterlund [82]).3 Interestingly such a model also gives rise to an optimal
solicitation ordering, which appears consistent with the contribution ordering commonly
observed. When the quality of the non-prot is unknown, high-quality organizations nd it
optimal to rst solicit their wealthiest donor.4 The reason is not simply that wealthy donors
1New York Times, March 30, 2002, p. A13.
2When contributions are made sequentially, the rst mover can commit to a small initial contribution
and e¤ectively free ride of the contribution of the subsequent contributor. The contribution level in the
sequential game is therefore no larger than that in the simultaneous game.
3Potters et al. [71] show experimentally that sequential moves result in larger overall contributions, and
that signalling is a likely explanation for this increase in contributions. Potters et al. [72] show that a
sequential contribution ordering will arise endogenously when there is uncertainty about the quality of the
public good.
4To not reveal their type low-quality organizations may also rst solicit wealthy donors.
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are willing to pay more to investigate the charity, but also that they need to increase their
contribution more to convince others that an organization is of high quality.
While imperfect information about the nonprots quality can help explain why some
organizations rst solicit the wealthy donors, it is important to note that this contribution
ordering also is used by more established nonprots, where there is less uncertainty about
their quality. This suggests that signaling is unlikely to be the only reason for the observed
solicitation ordering. An alternative explanation may be found by considering other char-
acteristics of the initial donors. Lead contributors distinguish themselves not only by being
wealthy, but also by being well-known and well-respected. In particular they are often seen
as having a higher rank in the social hierarchy.5 The objective of this paper is to exam-
ine if and how concerns for status may help explain why more well-known and respected
individuals tend to contribute rst.
Economists have come to recognize that status and concerns for status may a¤ect both
economic decisions and the allocation of resources. The literature is extensive, and the notion
that individuals are concerned about their relative standing is not new.6 Of particular
interest have been the theoretical implications of such concerns. For example Frank [36]
examines behavior when status is determined by ones ordinal rank in the distribution of
consumption, income, or wealth. Fersthman and Weiss [32] study the role of social status
in a general equilibrium framework. They show that changes in the demand for status may
a¤ect the wage structure, the level of aggregate output and economic welfare. Congleton
[17] studies status-seeking games in which an individuals utility is not only determined by
his absolute consumption, but also by his relative expenditure on status-seeking activities.
He shows that some status-seeking activities may generate positive externalities, and that
status acquisition need not be wasteful. More recently Hopkins and Kornienko [49] examine
behavior when individuals care about their relative rank in the distribution of consumption
of a "positional" good. They nd that a result of such preferences is that too many resources
are allocated to consumption of the positional good.7
5A persons status is a ranking in any hierarchy that is socially recognized.
6For early explorations of status see e.g., Smith [76], Veblen [83], and Becker [13].
7See Ball et al. [12] and Hopkins and Kornienko [49] for reviews of the status literature. The literature
on social identity and prestige is also related. Harbaugh [44, 45] examines a model where an individuals
contribution provides prestige, and he shows that a charity may increase total contributions by using a
2
While substantial theoretical work has been conducted to examine the potential e¤ects
of status, little work has been done to demonstrate its actual behavioral implications. One
exception is Ball et al. [12]. Using experimental methods they induce status in the laboratory
and examine prices in a competitive market where either the buyer or the seller side has low
status, while the other side has high status. To secure that there is room for status to
inuence market outcomes, they use a box-design market, where a vertical overlap in supply
and demand ensures that there are multiple equilibrium prices. They show that independent
of which side of the market is held by the high-status agents, they always capture a greater
share of the surplus.
Finding that concerns for status a¤ect behavior in a competitive market lead us to expect
that it also can inuence many other behaviors, and we want to examine, theoretically and
experimentally, if status concerns a¤ect voluntary contributions to nonprots. Following
Ball et al. [12] we take the social ranking as given and assume that individuals prefer to
associate with those of higher status, but not with those of lower status than themselves.
We incorporate such status-motivated preferences into a voluntary-contribution model to
examine if they give rise to an optimal-solicitation order, where high-status individuals give
rst. We then test the predicted comparative statics experimentally.
We consider a simple linear-contribution mechanism when members of a group di¤er in
their status ranking. There are two members of each group, and they must each decide
whether to contribute to a group activity. Contributing incurs a private cost, but generates
a benet for both group members. Consistent with the frequently observed contribution pat-
tern, our model demonstrates that to maximize total contributions the optimal solicitation
ordering is one where individuals of high-status contribute prior to, rather than after, those
of low status. There are two reasons why this ordering is optimal. First, an initial contribu-
tion by those of high status subsequently encourages individuals of low status to contribute.
Second, knowing that low-status contributors mimic the high-status contribution encourages
the high-status person to give as well. The latter e¤ect arises because the benet of the sub-
category reporting plan. Andreoni and Petrie [5] alter the identication of the participants and information
on their contribution in an experimental study. By doing so, they allow social e¤ects such as pride, shame,
social comparison and prestige to a¤ect participantsdecisions. They nd that identity and information
matter. Akerlof and Kranton [3] analyze the e¤ects identity, i.e., a persons sense of self, has on economic
outcomes.
3
sequent contribution may be su¢ cient to overcome the monetary and status cost associated
with giving to the same organization as someone of low status.
We follow Ball et al.s [12] status-inducement procedure to examine the extent to which
the predicted comparative statics are good approximations for actual behavior. Having
induced status in the laboratory we pair people in groups of two, where one participant
has higher status than the other. Using a between-subject design we compare the e¤ect on
behavior of reversing the contribution order between the two participants. That is, in one
treatment the leader has high status and the follower low status, and in the second treatment
the contribution order is reversed.
Our experimental results are consistent with the predicted comparative statics. Low-
status followers tend to mimic the high-status leaderscontributions, providing high-status
leaders with a monetary incentive to give. In contrast, high-status followers are reluctant to
mimic low-status leaders, and low-status leaders therefore do not have a monetary incentive
to contribute. Many leaders appear to correctly anticipate these responses, and high-status
leaders contribute substantially more than low-status leaders. The net e¤ect is that total
contributions increase by more than 80 percent when high-status participants contribute
rst.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we introduce a
simple model for voluntary contributions and examine the interaction between contribution
order and status. This model serves as the foundation for our experimental design, which
is described in Section 1.3. The associated results are presented in Section 1.4, and Section
1.5 concludes.
1.2 A SIMPLE MODEL OF VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS WITH
STATUS
There are a number of ways in which concerns for status can a¤ect charitable giving. First,
an individuals contribution may a¤ect how she is ranked relative to other people, and hence
a motivation for giving may be status acquisition. Second, an individuals status prior to
giving may inuence her contribution behavior. Although her contribution to the New York
4
Library may have enhanced her status, Brook Astor was already known to be the grand-
dame of philanthropy prior to giving, and it is possible that this initial status inuenced her
contribution.
We focus on an environment where a status di¤erential exists prior to the individual
contributing. Taking the social hierarchy as given, we determine how such a di¤erential may
alter the predictions of the charitable-giving model. Of particular interest is whether, in the
presence of status, fundraisers and donors prefer that contributions be made simultaneously
or in sequence, and if so who they would prefer contribute rst?
We will use a simple binary example to illustrate the e¤ect concerns for status may
have on voluntary contributions. Suppose that two potential contributors, Player A and
Player B, each must allocate a unit endowment to either a private good (gi = 0) or a public
good (gi = 1). If allocated to the private good the individual gets a return of one, while
an allocation to the public good generates a return of m to both players. The individuals
return from the interaction is given by
i = 1  gi +m(gA + gB); i 2 fA;Bg:8
In addition to the return from the public and private good, we assume that individuals
also are concerned about the status of the individuals they interact with. Following Ball et al.
[12] we assume that individuals want to associate with people who have higher status than
themselves and dislike associating with those of lower status.9 Association can be prevented
by not contributing to the same organization, and it can be secured by contributing to the
same organization as someone else.10 In addition to the monetary payo¤, we assume that
individual is utility from contributing to the same organization as individual j, also is an
8The theoretical predictions extend to many alternative specications. We focus on this simple binary
case because it mirrors our experimental setting.
9Note that the predicted comparative statics do not depend on the latter part of this assumption. All
that is required is that individuals prefer to associate with those of high status. Thus a model where the
status component takes the form ei:maxf(sj   si); 0g.gA.gB , results in the same predictions.
10Perhaps one explanation for why individuals like to associate with those of high status lie in the following
statement made by Akerlof and Kranton [3]: In a world of social di¤erence, one of the most important
economic decisions that an individual makes may be the type of person to be. Limits on this choice would
also be critical determinants of economic behavior, opportunity, and well being.Thus individuals may not
only make decisions on how much of the public good they want provided, but also about their identity. In
particular, they decide whether to associate themselves with their opponents in the contribution game.
5
increasing function of the status term Sij = ei.(sj   si).gigj, where si 2 R+ denotes the
individuals status score, and ei 2 [0; 1] the individuals status concern. Thus, the marginal
return from giving is larger when contributing to charities with a high-status donor base,
and the return is increasing in the amount given by these high-status donors. Combining
the two elements we consider the simple quasi-linear utility function:
Ui = 1  gi +m(gA + gB) + ei(sj   si)gAgB; i 2 fA;Bg:11
The parameters of the model are assumed to be common knowledge. We focus on the
case where ignoring the status term there is a social dilemma, i.e., 0:5 < m < 1. Implying
that when ei = 0; i 2 fA;Bg, it is e¢ cient for both to contribute, but independent of the
contribution order neither individual will choose to do so.
Now let us examine behavior when participants are concerned about status, i.e., ei > 0.
Note rst that independent of the solicitation order neither donor contributes when the other
donor has the same status level as herself.12 Consider instead the case where individual A
has more status than individual B, i.e., sA > sB, and refer to individual A as the high-status
agent and individual B as the low-status agent. We focus on the situation where individuals
di¤er only in their individual status, that is, both players have the same individual-specic
status concerns, normalizing ei = e = 1. Thus low-status individuals are as eager to be with
someone of high status as the high-status individuals are reluctant to be with someone of
low status.
How should a contribution-maximizing fundraiser design his campaign in such an envi-
ronment? Suppose he rst solicits the low-status agent, and subsequently the high-status
one. Since in this case the low-status contribution is taken as given, contributing is costly
for the high-status follower and she allocates her endowment to the private good. Knowing
that the high-status follower will not contribute, the low-status leaders return from giving
is only m, and he too allocates his endowment to the private good. Thus no contributions
11Our intent is to illustrate the comparative statics that may result when individuals have status concerns.
Such concerns may enter the utility function in a number of di¤erent ways. For our binary example we
consider the particularly simple example Ui. In continuous contribution models interior solutions will often
require that the status component is some f(Sij), where f 0 > 0, and f" < 0.
12The zero contribution is due to the linear voluntary contribution model. Generally the contribution
levels just reduce to those of the standard contribution model, thus if there is an interior equilibrium in the
model without status, then there will also be one in the model where individuals do not di¤er in their status.
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are made to the public good when the low-status agent is solicited rst. The outcome is the
same if the two agents simultaneously contribute to the public good, the reason is that once
again the high-status agent takes the low-status contribution as given and therefore does not
contribute. Therefore, when agents give simultaneously or the low-status agent goes rst the
equilibrium prediction is the same as in the classical linear contribution model (i.e., when
ei = 0).
Interestingly, this prediction does not hold when the high-status person is the rst to
give.13 The reason is that a low-status follower mimics the high-status contribution when
sA   sB > 1   m, that is when the added benet of being associated with someone of
high status is su¢ cient to compensate for the cost of contributing. How does this inuence
the high-status leader? The followers mimicking compensates the leader for the cost she
experiences from contributing to the same charity as someone of low status. Specically,
conditional on a low-status follower mimicking her action, a high-status leader contributes
if the followers status is not too low and is compensated by the net return from the public
good, specically when sA   sB < 2m   1.14 When the di¤erence in status between the
two donors is neither too large nor too small, i.e., 2m   1 > sA   sB > 1  m, we see that
contributions can be secured by rst soliciting the high-status person, then announcing the
contribution, and asking the low-status person to give.
While participants of low status prefer to associate with those of higher status, their
ability to do so is limited by the contribution ordering. In particular they are only able to
do so in the sequential-move game where those of high-status give rst.
Interestingly a status di¤erential can give rise to an e¢ cient outcome, where both indi-
viduals contribute to the public good. This suggests that in contrast to the common view
that status acquisition is wasteful and decreases overall welfare, there may be cases where
this need not be the case. In particular the resulting status di¤erential may facilitate a con-
tribution game, which generates welfare improvements that outweigh any status acquisition
13Romano and Yildirim [75] extend Varians [81] analysis of the classical voluntary contribution model to
more general preferences. Maintaining the assumption that leaders benet from the followers contribution,
they show that contributions in the sequential game will be larger than in the simultaneous one as long as
the best response function of the follower is increasing in the leaders contribution.
14This condition is not relevant when participants only aim to be with those of higher status, but do not
care about being associated with those of lower status (e.g., maxf(sj si); 0g:gAgB). In this case the leaders
contribution is triggered as long as we consider a social dilemma where 2m  1 > 0.
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costs. 15
Our analysis of this simple example provides some important insights. Consistent with
the frequently observed solicitation ordering, we show that status di¤erentials may cause
a contribution-maximizing fundraiser to have an optimal solicitation ordering, whereby he
rst solicits the high-status donor. Furthermore, such a contribution order can arise even in
the absence of a fundraiser. The reason is that since the high-status individual is better o¤
contributing and triggering the contributions of others, he will volunteer to go rst.
1.3 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
To examine whether status di¤erentials may be an alternative explanation for the frequently
observed contribution ordering, we need to determine whether our predicted comparative
statics are good approximations of actual behavior.
Using experimental methods we study behavior in a voluntary contribution game where
some individuals have higher status than others.16 A number of alternative approaches can
be used to examine the e¤ect. One possibility is to rely on individual characteristics that
previously have been thought to be associated with high status, e.g., gender and height.17
Another possibility is to induce status in the laboratory. There are several reasons why we
choose the latter of these two approaches. First, in our study it is crucial that participants
agree on who has high versus low status. However, individuals have several di¤erent status
characteristics, and while we may be sorting them according to one characteristic, partici-
15The argument here di¤ers from that of Congleton [17]. He demonstrates that acquisition of status need
not be wasteful if status is acquired from investing in a good that has positive externalities. In contrast our
results suggest that existing status di¤erences may inuence subsequent behavior and cause an improvement
in welfare even when status acquisition is costly.
16The experiment was programmed and conducted using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher [35]).
17An example of a study that examines the e¤ect of an individuals prior status is Bohnet and Hong
[14]. Using individual characteristics to classify individual status (e.g., gender, race, religion), they nd
that while low- and high-status groups are equally unlikely to trust others, the motives for distrust di¤er.
Individuals with high-status characteristics do not trust because they fear betrayal, and those with low-
status characteristics do not trust for fear of inequality (but are indi¤erent to the risk of betrayal). Since
individuals are not aware of the characteristics of their opponent in the study, they examine only the e¤ect an
individuals status has on own behavior. Glaeser et al. [38] measure an individuals status by characteristics
such as whether you have a sexual partner, drink alcohol on weekends, and family education. They too nd
little e¤ect of status on trusting behavior, but nd that those of higher status elicit more trust worthiness.
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pants may instead be focusing on a di¤erent characteristic. Second, even if individuals pay
attention to the dimension by which we sort them, there may not be agreement on what
constitutes high or low status. For example, individuals may disagree on how geeks or jocks
rank in the social hierarchy. Third, and perhaps most importantly, commonly accepted sta-
tus characteristics may not only be indicative of an individual having higher status, but also
of them having di¤erent preferences. For example, while gender and height commonly are
used to characterize an individuals status, others have argued that preferences also di¤er
along these dimensions. For example, some studies have found males to be more risk seeking,
less reciprocating, more trusting, and less altruistic than females.18 If these characteristics
are correct then a study using males (as high status) and females (as low status) may nd
results consistent with the predicted comparative statics simply because preferences di¤er
systematically by gender. In particular, we may be mislead to interpret the results as sug-
gesting that status inuences behavior, when instead the results are caused by generous and
reciprocating female followers being more likely to mimic the leaders action, and the risk
seeking more trusting male leaders being more willing to make an initial contribution.19
To secure that participants in the laboratory jointly recognize the status di¤erential, and
to avoid that our results potentially are driven by di¤erences in preferences, we follow the
Ball et al. [12] procedure to induce a status di¤erential among our participants.20
Mirroring our simple model we pair participants in groups of two, where one person has
higher status than the other one. We study voluntary contributions in two di¤erent treat-
ments that only di¤er in the participantscontribution order. In one treatment participants
with high status contribute before those of low status, in the other, the contribution order
18E.g., Croson and Buchan [19] and Chaudhuri and Gangadharan [16] nd that men exhibit greater trust
and women show higher levels of reciprocity. Eckel and Grossman [26] nd that women are more risk averse
and Eckel et al. [27] nd that females are more altruistic. Andreoni and Vesterlund [4] describe a more
complex picture of gender di¤erences in altruism. See Eckel and Grossmann [28, 29] as well as Croson and
Gneezy [20] for reviews of experimental research on gender di¤erences.
19Taller people have also been found to be less altruistic than shorter people (Harbaugh et al. [46]).
Persico et al. [69] nd that while taller men earn more than short ones, this correlation can be explained
using height at age 16. Height as an adult does not add any additional explanatory power. They attribute
this to the fact that taller adolescents report have larger social networks, which they hypothesize lead to the
development of skills that are valuable in the labor market. Thus observed di¤erences between short and
tall people need not be due to a status di¤erential.
20Inducing status di¤erences gives participants a common experience thereby diminishing the possibility
that there is disagreement on who has higher status.
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is reversed. Thus members of the higher-status group are assigned to one of the two roles
(leaders or followers) facing members of the other group in the other role.
We ran four sessions of each treatment with 12 participants in each session. A total
of 96 participants were recruited from the Pittsburgh area and were randomly assigned to
a treatment.21 No participant was allowed to participate in more than one session of the
experiment.
An identical protocol was used in each of the two treatments.22 The protocol consisted of
two parts. The rst was a status-inducement exercise and the second a sequential voluntary-
contribution game.
Upon arrival, participants were seated throughout the laboratory. They were given the
rst part of the status-inducement exercise, as they were asked to answer a trivia quiz which
contained ten general knowledge questions with numerical answers.23 Participants were told
they would receive $5 for completing the quiz, and that their answers to the quiz would be
used to determine their role in the experiment. Once everyone had completed the quiz and
it was collected, an experimenter proceeded to hand out the instructions for the sequential
voluntary-contribution game.
While one experimenter read the instructions for the voluntary-contribution part of the
experiment, a second experimenter (who was seated towards the front of the room) reviewed
the trivia quiz answers and determined which participants would be assigned to either a star-
group (high-status) or a no-star-group (low-status). To secure that participants randomly
were assigned to the star- versus no-star-group we used the size of the answer to the last
question on the trivia quiz to determine their assignment. In half the sessions participants in
the star-group consisted of the six participants who provided the largest numerical answers
to the last question, and in the remaining sessions members of the star-group were those who
provided the smallest numerical answer.24 Participants were not told what the assignment
21The majority of the participants were undergraduate students at the University of Pittsburgh.
22A copy of the trivia quiz and the instructions for the experiment can be found in the Appendix A.
23It is generally argued that status may arise in any dimension individuals care about. One such dimension
is knowledge, e.g., Nie et al. [68] argue that education is a good proxy for relative status.
24Our procedure di¤ers slightly from that of Ball et al. [12] where the quiz consisted of 5 obscure economic
questions with numerical answers, and assignment to the star-group was based on the sum of the ve
numerical answers. Surprisingly they nd that status has less of an e¤ect in an awarded than in an
obviously random-status treatment. They argue that this most likely is because the test was considered
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procedure was.
Once the instructions for the voluntary contribution game were reviewed participants
were asked to calculate payo¤s for the possible decisions that may occur in the game. The
answers to these questions were then presented on the blackboard. Participants were allowed
to ask questions by raising their hand and speaking to the experimenter in private. No
communication among participants was allowed.
Having completed the instructions to the decision-making part of the experiment, we
then held an award ceremony to assign participants to the two groups. We rst called out
the ID numbers for those who were assigned to the star-group. One by one they were invited
to come to the front of the room where they were given a shiny black folder with a gold
star as well as a congratulatory ribbon which they were asked to wear for the remainder of
the experiment. A public applause was given once all six members of the star-group were
standing at the front of the room. Members of the star-group where then seated in the two
front rows of the laboratory. The walls of this section were marked by three large gold stars,
and the individual computers had a gold-star sticker attached to the board. While seating
members of the star-group, members of the no-star-group were asked to come and receive a
yellow manila folder, and were then seated in the back two rows of the laboratory.
Once everyone was seated we reviewed the content of the folders. The content of the two
types of folders were the same, both included a brief summary of instructions and a record
sheet. We then read the summary of instructions and began the voluntary-contribution
game. The game consisted of 12 contribution rounds. In each round, a star participant was
anonymously and randomly paired with a no-star participant, under the stipulation that no
participant was paired with another participant twice in a row, and that no two participants
could be paired more than twice during a session.
In each round participants were given the choice between two actions A and B.25 Choos-
ing A gave the participant a $1 payo¤, while choosing B provided both players with a payo¤
of 75 cents. Choosing A corresponds to not contributing (gi = 0) and choosing B corre-
sponds to contributing (gi = 1). After leaders made their decisions, followers observed the
unfair. We therefore choose to modify the questions such that they do not relate to economics, and may be
considered more fair.
25The voluntary contribution game mirrors that of Potters et al. [71] when m = 0:75.
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leaderscontributions and made their decisions. In one treatment members of the star-group
were asked to contribute rst, we refer to this as the Star-First treatment, in the other
treatment members of the no-star-group were asked to contribute rst, we refer to this as
the Star-Second treatment. At the end of each round the participants were informed about
the choices and the payo¤s in their game, and they recorded this information on their record
sheets.
At the end of the 12 rounds participants were asked to come to a back room where they
were paid in private for their participation in the two parts of the experiment. Each session
of the experiment lasted a little less than an hour and average earnings were $18:93 (with a
minimum of $15:5 and a maximum of $23).
1.4 RESULTS
Our analyses of the data focus on testing the predicted comparative statics of our model.
In particular we examine whether total contributions to the public good are larger when
individuals of high status contribute rst. We then examine the underlying dynamics of
such a nding, in particular we see if low-status followers are more likely to mimic the
leaders contribution, and whether in anticipation of such a response high-status leaders
contribute more frequently than low-status leaders. While conrmatory answers to these
questions will be seen as supportive of our simple model, one must keep in mind that the
results are very sensitive to the status di¤erential we manage to induce in the laboratory.
The induced status di¤erential depends crucially on the experimenters ability to convince
participants that there is a di¤erence, and the resulting di¤erential is likely to be minimal
relative to those that arise in the real world.
Observing the participantsbehaviors in the laboratory suggest that they did care about
the status-inducement part of the experiment. They were anxious to get the results of the
quiz, and those assigned to the star-group seemed very pleased with themselves, while those
in the no-star-group did not. There is less evidence that they consciously thought about their
assignment when making decisions in the voluntary-contribution part of the experiment. In
our open-ended exit survey regarding their voluntary-contribution decisions, only one of our
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participants made reference to the star- vs. no-star assignment. The participantsbehavior
upon leaving the experiment suggests, however, that they still cared about their assigned role.
While all participants were asked to leave their folders and other material by their computer,
members of the star-group frequently brought their shiny folders and ribbons with them to
receive payment, such behaviors were never observed among the no-star members.
Despite inducing a potentially small status di¤erential, our results from the Star-First
and Star-Second treatments strongly support the predicted comparative statics. Figure
1 shows the average group contribution per round. With two people in each group the
maximum contribution is 2. We see that on average group contributions are 80% larger
when high-status participants contribute rst. As usual in public-good games, the frequency
of contributions is larger in the rst half than in the second half of the experiment, and this
decrease in contributions is observed in both treatments. Note however that the di¤erence
between treatments does not decrease. Whether we look at the rst or second half of the
experiment, aggregate contributions remain larger in the Star-First treatments. Using each
session as the unit of observation the conservative Mann-Whitney U-test reveals that these
di¤erences in aggregate contributions are statistically signicant, whether we look at the
entire experiment, or only the rst half or second half of the experiment.26
Thus letting the high-status leader contribute rst rather than last has a substantial
and signicant e¤ect on aggregate contributions. Next we examine whether behaviors by
followers and leaders are consistent with those predicted.
We start by examining the frequency by which followers mimic the leaders contribution.
While not contributing remains the payo¤-dominant strategy for the followers, Figure 2 shows
that a number of followers nonetheless contribute and that such deviations are more common
in the Star-First treatment. While low-status followers on average mimic high-status leaders
45% of the time, this only happens 30% of the time with high-status followers and low-status
leaders. This di¤erence is statistically signicant, i.e., we reject the null hypothesis that the
follower is less likely to mimic a leader contribution when the high-status participant gives
rst (one-sided p-value is :0786). In contrast, when the leader does not contribute, only
26The three one-sided p-values are no larger than 0:0571. A summary of the reported statistical tests can
be found in Appendix B.
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Figure 1: Average Group Contributions per Round
6% and 5% of the followers choose to contribute in Star-First and Star-Second treatments,
respectively. Hence, by contributing a leader can increase the probability that a follower
contributes by 39% in the Star-First treatment and by 25% in the Star-Second treatment.
While this di¤erence may appear small it implies that a payo¤-maximizing leader prefers
to contribute when she is of high status, but not when she is of low status. Since the cost
of contributing is 25 cents, and each contribution by the follower generates a leader payo¤
of 75 cents, the leader is better o¤ contributing as long as her contribution increases the
probability that the follower contributes by 33%.
Next we examine whether leaders in the two treatments appear to anticipate the fol-
lowers response. Figure 3 illustrates the leaders contribution frequency in each treatment.
As predicted high-status leaders are more likely to contribute than low-status leaders. While
the contribution frequency is 55% among high-status leaders, it is only 33% among low-status
leaders. Despite the decrease in contributions over the course of the game, the di¤erence
between the contribution frequencies remains substantial and in the 22 23 percentage-point
range. This di¤erence is signicant whether we examine the entire experiment, or only the
rst or second half of the experiment.27 The larger contribution rate among high-status
27One-sided p-values for the three tests are no larger than 0:0429.
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Figure 2: Conditional Contribution Probabilities
leaders suggests that they, from the very beginning of the game, have di¤erent expecta-
tions about the followers response, and that this di¤erence in expectations between the two
treatments is maintained throughout the game.
While the larger leader contributions in the Star-First treatment are consistent with
our predictions, they are not necessarily what we would have anticipated in light of past
experimental results. For example, Ho¤man and Spitzer [48] show that individuals who earn
a role in a simple bargaining game feel entitled to that role and tend to make less generous
o¤ers. To the extent that our high-status leaders feel that they are entitled to their role
of leaders, one may therefore have anticipated that they contribute less, rather than more,
than low-status leaders.
Combined the higher leader-contribution rates and the more frequent mimicking in the
Star-First treatment has substantial implications on the follower-contribution rates in the
two treatments. These are illustrated in Figure 4. The follower-contribution frequency
is much larger in the Star-First than Star-Second treatment. While low-status followers
contribute 27% of the time, high-status followers only do so 13% of the time. This di¤erence
in contributions is signicant.28
28One-sided p-values for all 12; the rst six, or the last six rounds are no larger than 0:0571.
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Figure 3: Frequency of Contributions by the Leader
Interestingly behavior in the Star-Second treatment is very similar to what has been
seen in experiments absent status. Potters et al. [71] uses the same type of environment
to analyze the e¤ects of announcements on contributions when there is uncertainty about
the quality of the public good. They observe that if there is no uncertainty and m = 0:75,
the leaders contribution frequency is 27%, and conditional on the leader contributing the
follower contributes 33:3% of the time. Their ndings are very close to what we observe
in the Star-Second treatment, where low-status leaders contribution frequency is 33%, and
conditional on the leader contributing the high-status follower contributes 30% of the time.
Thus while behavior in the Star-Second treatment di¤ers from the economic prediction that
there be no contributions, as predicted individual contributions are very similar to what is
observed in an environment without status.
As an alternative explanation for our results it may be argued that perhaps the di¤erence
between treatments is caused by followers being likely to mimic behavior of those who are
perceived to be more intelligent but not those who are less intelligent. In considering this
explanation it is important to recognize that intelligence is considered an important status
indicator. Thus if mimicking by low-status followers is driven by a desire to associate with
those of greater intelligence then this interpretation is in line with our status model. This is
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Figure 4: Frequency of Contributions by the Follower
however not the case if individuals mimic the high-status leaders because these are perceived
to have a superior understanding of the game. There are a number of reasons why we do not
think that the latter is a convincing explanation for our results. First, the examined game
is an exceptionally simple one and it is hard to imagine that perceived superior performance
on our unrelated trivia quiz would be seen as an indicator of greater game theoretic insights.
Second, if our results are driven by participants mimicking behavior of those who are more
intelligent, and not those who are less intelligent. Then we should observe treatment di¤er-
ences both when the leader does and does not contribute. However, when the leader fails to
contribute, the contribution rate of the follower is 5  6% independent of treatment.29
Another suggested explanation for our results is that perhaps high-status individuals
simply feel more generous once they have been rewarded high status. Note however that
while this explanation is consistent with the observation that high-status leaders give more,
it is not consistent with the fact that high-status followers give less than low-status followers.
Next we examine the e¤ect of status on individual earnings. A common view among
economists has been that individuals acquire status not because they value status itself, but
29Similarly if participants perceived low-status leaders as being less intelligent then it is somewhat sur-
prising that the behavior in our Star-Second treatment is so similar to a no-status treatment. Finally, if
participants perceived members of the star group as being more intelligent, then we would have anticipated
that such an e¤ect would have been mentioned on the exit questionnaire.
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rather that they seek it because high status allows higher incomes and better consumption
opportunities (see e.g., Postlewaite [70]).30 The prediction that high-status individuals earn
more has been conrmed in a couple of studies. For example, Ball and Eckel [11] examine
bargaining games and show larger high-status earnings. Ball et al. [12] show that this
nding extends to competitive markets, where low-status individuals appear to bear the cost
of associating themselves with the high-status individuals. Similarly Glaeser et al. [38] nd
evidence suggesting that individuals with high-status characteristics tend to extract larger
rents from a voluntary non-market transaction, namely a trust game.
The prediction of our simple model, however, is not that high-status individuals have
higher earnings than those of low status. While no earnings di¤erential is predicted in the
Star-Second treatment, di¤erences may arise in the Star-First treatment. Specically, when
agents have heterogeneous status concerns it is entirely possible that earnings of the high-
status leader be smaller than those of the low-status follower. The reason is that low-status
followers only contribute when a high-status leader has already done so. Suppose that only
some low-status followers are willing to mimic the contribution of a high-status leader, and
that the proportion doing so is large enough to provide some leaders with an incentive to
contribute. Such an environment will cause the average contributions of high-status leaders
to be larger than those of low-status followers, and as a result individuals of high-status will
on average earn less than those of low-status.
Table 1 reports average earnings from the two treatments. Focusing rst on the Star-First
treatment, we see high-status leaders earning less than their low-status followers.31 Thus,
contradictory to the common economic assumption, in the Star-First treatment high-status
individuals earn less, rather than more, than those of low status. As pointed out above this
nding is entirely in line with our simple model. In contrast the earnings di¤erential found
in the Star-Second treatment contradicts the prediction. Rather than nding no di¤erence
we see low-status leaders earning less than their high-status followers.32 Independent of the
treatment, both star- and no-star-participants earn more as followers.33 This latter nding
30In contrast, biology and evolutionary psychology, proposes that people pursue status as an (emotional)
goal in itself, independent of the other benets status may engender.
31One-sided p = 0:0143 over the 12 rounds or the rst six rounds, and p = 0:0286 for the last six rounds.
32One-sided p = 0:0143 over the 12 rounds or the rst six rounds, and p = 0:0429 for the last six rounds.
33For star participants we can reject the hypothesis that leader earnings exceed those of followers over the
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implies that in contrast to the theory high-status individuals will not necessarily volunteer
to move rst.34
Table 1: Average Earnings ($) per Participant per Session
Leaders Followers
Star-First 12.8 16.1
Star-Second 12.2 14.6
So given these results what contribution ordering should we anticipate?35 To the extent
that a contribution-maximizing fundraiser is in charge of a campaign it is clear that he rst
will solicit donors who have high social ranking. Interestingly this contribution ordering
not only maximizes the contributions but also aggregate earnings. The sum of leader and
follower earnings is signicantly larger in the Star-First treatment.36 This suggests that
while an individuals status-seeking activities may be a wasteful use of productive resources,
such activities may nonetheless be welfare improving. When individuals hold di¤erent ranks
in a social hierarchy a properly selected solicitation ordering may give rise to contribution
levels that are not achievable absent di¤erential rankings.
12 rounds and the rst six rounds (one-sided p = 0:0286 and p = 0:0429 respectively). We cannot reject this
hypothesis during the last six rounds (p = 0:1357). For non-stars we reject the hypothesis that earnings are
larger as a leader than follower overall and for both the rst and second half of the experiment (one-sided
p = 0:0143 in all three cases).
34Caution needs to be taken when comparing these two exogenously imposed contribution orders. As
shown by Potters et al. [71] behavior may di¤er when the contribution order arises endogenously.
35In fact, fundraisers have one more alternative strategy which prescribes the simultaneous move of donors.
However, Potters et al. [72] observe that when there is no uncertainty and m = 0:75, average contributions
in the simultaneous-move and the sequential-move games are almost identical. As demonstrated earlier,
the di¤erence between contribution levels in the Star-Second treatment and Potters et al. sequential-move
treatment is negligible. This may be seen as evidence that a fundraiser will not prefer simultaneous-move
game in this environment.
36One-sided p = 0:0143 over the 12 rounds and the rst six rounds, and p = 0:0571 for the last six rounds.
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1.5 CONCLUSION
Fundraisers often start their campaigns by soliciting the wealthier, more recognized, and
respected individuals in a community. We have examined whether concerns for status may
help explain such a solicitation strategy. Assuming that individuals prefer to associate with
those of higher status, we use a simple linear example to show that the observed solicitation
strategy is likely to benet all the involved parties. Asking individuals of high status to
give before rather than after those of lower status will not only result in an increase in
overall contributions, but also in an improvement in welfare. Thus the organization, the
fundraiser, and the associated donors will benet from there being a di¤erential in social
status. Interestingly this implies that costly status acquisition may be welfare enhancing.
Evidence from our laboratory experiment is consistent with the predicted dynamics of
our model. When individuals with high status contribute rst, low-status followers are likely
to mimic the initial contribution, thereby providing the leader with a monetary incentive
to give. In contrast if a low-status individual contributes rst, the high-status follower is
reluctant to mimic the initial contribution.
Despite inducing a small status di¤erential in the laboratory, we nonetheless nd that,
provided the correct contribution ordering, such a di¤erential can give rise to a welfare
improving and large increase in total contributions. In light of the more substantial status
di¤erences that occur in the real world, fundraisers may therefore be well served to rst
solicit donors who have high status. Of course this is precisely what fundraisers tend to do.
When asked why they start by soliciting the wealthier and more prominent individuals, their
explanations tend to be that this strategy helps create enthusiasm around the campaign.37
There is however no explanation provided for why this is the case. Our paper has shown both
theoretically and experimentally that one such explanation may be that individuals like to
associate with those who have higher status than themselves. When asked more specically
if the commonly used strategy may work because it enables subsequent donors to associate
37The chairman of the trustees of Johns Hopkins explains that the reason why the university asks donors
for permission to announce their gifts is that fundamentally we are all followers. If I can get somebody to
be the leader, others will follow. I can leverage that gift many times over.The New York Times, February
2, 1997, p. 10. Our study demonstrates that this statement relies crucially on who is used as the leader.
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with the initial donors, one fundraiser commented that indeed the strategy appears to work
well when it enables new money to associate with old money.
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2.0 SOCIAL SECURITY AND SELF-CONTROL PREFERENCES (WITH
ATHANASIOS C. THANOPOULOS)
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Historically, the necessity of a social security system in the U.S. emerged as a consequence
of the Great Depression for the purpose of inter-temporal distribution of the impact of
economic crises. Since only certain generations experience adverse shocks, albeit not due
exclusively to their own actions or choices, it has been considered as socially desirable (and
coherence-promoting) to devise a way to share that risk among di¤erent generations.
Nowadays, a social security system is principally considered to be a mechanism that
provides pension payments and associated benets to retirees and their families. Naturally,
the apparent merits it has for its beneciaries are coupled with substantial costs for the
economy: Thanks to the democratization of the aforementioned benets but also due to
adverse demographics, during the most recent decades social security spending has evolved
into the largest item in the government budget.
Therefore unavoidably, social security has become the object of increasingly intense study
by economists. There is an abundance of studies related to the importance of social security
and its impact on welfare. The primary reason for this is its dramatically growing scale which
triggers -but also never ceases to feed- an e¤ervescent debate regarding the optimal allocation
of the -anyway scarce- resources. That controversy stems from the huge monetary burden
that the mere presence of a social security system entails for the society and the associated
budget implications: In a world of limited resources and ever-rising budget decits, the
dilemma of directing resources either to social security or to alternative uses becomes more
vital than ever.
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During the second half of the twentieth century, several studies seem to emerge as direct
or implicit o¤springs of this debate. Most of these focus on the welfare implications of
alternative social security systems in an economy. In the very core of this debate and
deliberately touching critical social coherence issues, one can clearly identify the dilemma
between an "unfunded" (Pay-As-You-Go) versus a "funded" social security system. In an
unfunded system, resources are transferred statically from the working population to the
concurrent retirees (inter-generational transfers). In contrast, a funded system prescribes a
dynamic allocation of resources within the same generation (inter-temporal within the same
generation transfers). While both systems rely on an external institution (e.g. government)
in order to be implemented, their di¤erent logic and mechanics eventually induce entirely
di¤erent allocations of risk. Therefore, their welfare implications may signicantly di¤er
because of this di¤erence.
Departing from the general problematic of "unfunded versus funded" and henceforth
conning our analysis to the former, the debate about the benets and costs of social security
also becomes more specic. While its economic benets are largely summarized in providing
intra- and inter-generational risk sharing, social security encourages early retirement and
entails very severe distortions in agentslabor supply and private savings decisions.1 The
latter can be readily shown in an overlapping generations model where consumers inelastically
supply labor (Diamond [22]): Since social security redistributes income from the young to
the old generation by imposing a tax on current workers income (payroll tax) -i.e. from
a generation with low propensity to consume to a generation with a high propensity to
consume- it lowers savings and consequently, the steady-state capital stock.2 Auerbach
and Kotliko¤ [9], Imrohoroglu et al. [51], and Hugget and Ventura [50] comprehensively
analyze the welfare implications of an unfunded social security system by using a large-
scale overlapping generations model. All these studies show that an unfunded social security
systems distortions in the amount of labor supply and capital accumulation exceeds its
1The -inherent to the insurance market- adverse selection problem induces a very thin annuities market
both in the U.S. and elsewhere. Hence, an unfunded social security system becomes an important tool for
providing risk-sharing. See Imrohoroglu et al. [51] and Diamond et al. [25] for more discussion on the market
for annuities.
2Reducing the steady state capital stock decreases welfare if it is below the "golden rule" level. However
in the opposite case (when the economy is "dynamically ine¢ cient") reducing capital improves welfare. Abel
et al. [1] report that the US economy is dynamically e¢ cient.
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benets and hence its existence in an economy reduces overall welfare.
Interestingly, the redistribution mechanism of social security and its induced between-
and-within generations allocation of risk is not the only factor that positively a¤ects welfare:
Potential idiosyncrasies in agents preferences highlight yet another extremely important
source of ambivalence with regard to the welfare implications of social security. Many studies,
both theoretical and empirical have argued on the welfare gains that can be accrued thanks
to social security when households lack the foresight to save adequately for their retirement.3
Two di¤erent research approaches have provided theoretical machinery as well as empir-
ical support that could serve in explaining the observed anomalies: It is well documented
in the experimental economics literature that subjects facing inter-temporal choice prob-
lems often exhibit preference reversals, or that their preferences feature some kind of time
inconsistency. In particular, when they are asked to choose between a smaller-earlier and
a larger-later reward, they seem to prefer the earlier reward when it o¤ered an immediate
payo¤, whereas the larger-later reward was preferred when both rewards were to be received
with delay (Gul and Pesendorfer [41]). Furthermore, during the last decade, advances in the
theory battleeld have elucidated the underlying factors that induce these anomalies. These
being well-known issues in the psychology literature, it would only be a matter of time until
they attracted economistsinterest: Incorporating disproportionate discounting of the imme-
diate future as an alternative to exponential discounting emerges through a series of studies.
Laibson [58], in particular, uses a quasi-hyperbolic (or quasi-geometric) discounting struc-
ture to incorporate possible preference reversals into economic theory. A quasi-hyperbolic
discounting structure provides the possibility to modify macroeconomic models which are
otherwise inadequate to explain the observed facts in the data.4 Models allowing quasi-
hyperbolic discounting seem to better explain the empirical facts compared to models with
the standard exponential discounting structure.
In a recent study that enhances considerably the insights found in Feldstein [31] by
exploiting these new theoretical advances, Imrohoroglu et al. [53] investigate the welfare
3Imrohoroglu et al. [53] provide a concise review of the relevant literature, as well as an interesting
discussion of the debate as to whether myopia is indeed empirically identied from e.g. unforeseen events
and other factors that cause a sudden drop in consumption at retirement.
4For instance, Diamond and Koszegi [23], Krusell et al. [55], and Krusell and Smith [57] analyze various
macroeconomic models by using Laibson-type preferences.
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e¤ects of unfunded social security in an economy populated by agents with Laibson-type
preferences who su¤er from inability to commit to future actions. Laibson [58] shows that
an agent endowed with quasi-hyperbolic discounting saves less compared to an agent en-
dowed with exponential discounting (e.g. an agent with CRRA preferences). The reason
is that the introduction of quasi-hyperbolic discounting creates a conict between di¤er-
ent intertemporal-selves and the agent cannot commit to his own future actions. Although
present-selves think that they save enough, future-selves regret the decisions made by the
former-selves. In order to make the quasi-hyperbolic discounter to save as much as the
exponential discounter, a commitment technology is required (note that the exponential
discounters naturally have this technology). In Imrohoroglu et al., the government saves
on behalf of the quasi-hyperbolic discounters through social security system. Their main
ndings are that: (1) quasi-hyperbolic discounters incur substantial welfare costs because of
their time-inconsistent behavior, (2) to maintain old-age consumption, social security is not
a good substitute for a perfect commitment technology, and (3) there is little room for social
security in a world of quasi-hyperbolic discounters.
In spite of their theoretical appeal in providing an alternative that adequately explains
observed patterns of behavior, quasi-hyperbolic discounting models entail a non-recursive
structure that renders them computationally intractable. This is because quasi-hyperbolic
discounting structure does not allow a desire for commitment to ones future actions.
Gul and Pesendorfer [41] choose a di¤erent approach in their attempt to explain prefer-
ence reversals. They develop self-control preferences that depend on what an agent actually
consumes on one hand, and what would be the level of consumption that would explain the
experimental phenomenon, on the other.5 To this purpose, they introduce self-control and
temptation utilities, concepts that capture the trade-o¤ between the temptation to consume
on the one hand, and the long-run self interest of the agent on the other. Under certain
rationality assumptions, preferences over sets of actions are consistent with experimental ev-
idence as in Laibson [58]. In stark contrast to Laibson-type preferences however, self-control
preferences are time-consistent. In particular (considering Laibsons framework for example),
5We will henceforth use the terms "Gul and Pesendorfer preferences" and "Self-Control preferences" inter-
changeably. It is worth noting that "Gul and Pesendorfer" preferences is not the only available specication
for self-control preferences in the literature.
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it is assumed that the preferences governing behavior at time t di¤er from the preferences
over continuation plans implied by the agents rst period preferences and choices prior to
period t. In contrast, self-control preferences may already exhibit a desire for commitment,
which is not the case in Laibson.
Gul and Pesendorfers self-control preferences have been utilized in di¤erent contexts in
various macroeconomic models in an attempt to resolve well-known puzzles in the literature.
DeJong and Ripoll [21] provide a concise asset pricing environment in order to investigate the
potentiality of self-control preferences to account for the volatility of stock prices. They show
that self-control preferences partially explain the level of price volatility that is observed in
the data. Similarly, Krusell et al. [56] analyze a general equilibrium asset pricing model
where a small subset of investors are tempted to save (not to consume). They contend that
their model can help to better understand some aspects of wealth and asset pricing data.
In this paper we explore the role of an unfunded social security system in a setting where
agents have self-control preferences. To this purpose, we develop an overlapping generation
model in which agents live up to the real age of 85 (corresponds to the model age of 65). The
economy consists of three sectors: agents, rms and a government. Agents have idiosyncratic
income and face a mortality risk. They work up to the real age of 65 (corresponds to
the model age of 45) whenever they have an opportunity to work. When unemployed or
retired, they are compensated by the government by unemployment insurance or retirement
benets respectively. In addition, they maintain positive asset holdings in order to insure
against idiosyncratic income risks and low old-age consumption. Moreover, we assume that
private credit markets (including annuitiesmarkets) are closed. The government collects
unemployment insurance and payroll taxes from workers to the purpose of nancing its
activities.
We compute the steady-state equilibria under di¤erent social security replacement rates
by calibrating our model economy to the U.S. economy. From previous studies we know
that if an economy is populated by agents with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
preferences i.e., neither facing a commitment nor a temptation problem, the introduction of
an unfunded social security system reduces welfare. The reason is that the insurance benet
of an unfunded social security system is dominated by its negative e¤ect on agentssavings
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decisions. Several interesting insights obtain in our setting: In congruence with Imrohoroglu
et al. [53] social security indeed tends to reduce welfare. In particular, when we consider a
utility function featuring a concave temptation component, the lifetime consumption path
remains essentially invariant to departures from the CRRA case. Accordingly, social security
remains equally detrimental to welfare under self control preferences as it is under CRRA
preferences. However, in the case of a convex temptation function the degree to which this
e¤ect obtains is substantially lower. Controlling for all other factors we infer that this is due
to our specication of preferences: Agents with self-control preferences face no commitment
problem. Nonetheless, the cost of resisting the temptation associated with the exertion of
self-control becomes very severe as wealth increases. In turn, this may impair overall savings
in an economy. In our environment, an unfunded social security system has no role as a
commitment apparatus but might play a role as a device to decrease available wealth when
agents make their consumption-savings decisions.
We identify the underpinnings of our results with the impact social security has on
agentsmarginal propensity to consume. In the "traditional" setting where agents have
CRRA preferences, the young have a low marginal propensity to consume while the old
have a high marginal propensity to consume. This relation preserves a high rate of capital
accumulation through higher savings during the young age. In contrast, in our environment
the young face temptations that operate as impediments to their propensity to (privately)
save. Alternatively, the agentsmarginal propensity to consume is not as low as it is in the
case of CRRA preferences. Accordingly, the cost of resisting temptation increases with the
level of wealth. Inevitably, social security by being a mechanism that is bound to deprive
agents from early consumption accomplishes at the same time to reduce the cost associated
with the exertion of self-control and consequently to partially o¤set its adverse e¤ect on
welfare. Note that this e¤ect is absent in environments where preferences do not allow
agents the option to exert self-control as in Imrohoroglu et al. [53].6
6Diamond [24] argues that the current unfunded social security system does not need radical reform and
it is enough to put the system on stronger nancial footing while improving the benet structure at the same
time. He states further that mandated savings make sense since many workers would not save enough for
their old-age consumption. Our results are in line with those of Diamond in the following sense: When agents
are endowed with temptation, they substantially save less due to the burden of resisting the temptation.
The current social security system helps agents to overcome the temptation problem and hence, the welfare
cost of the system is not very large.
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This chapter is organized as follows: The following section provides a concise introduction
to self-control preferences and time inconsistency. We briey present and compare the two
theories and attempt to shed light on the di¤erent implications they have for the question
at hand. Section 2.3 introduces the model economy. In Section 2.4, we dene the parameter
values of the model and explain the solution methodology. Section 2.5 presents the results
and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 METHODS OF ACCOUNTING FOR SELF-CONTROL
In this section we briey highlight the di¤erences between the Gul-Pesendorfer type and the
Laibson type of preferences as well as motivate the use of the former in this paper.
2.2.1 Laibson Type of Preferences
In our model preferences are dened over sequences of lifetime consumption, fc1; :; ck; :; cTg.
If agents in the economy have time consistent preferences, and a deterministic life-span
equal to T , the utility ranking of the lifetime consumption sequences will not depend on
their standpoint k : Ranking of these sequences will be invariant with respect to the time
the ranking took place.
The essence of the Laibson type of preferences is that the aforementioned invariance result
no longer holds: The discounting structure sets up a conict between todays preferences and
the preferences that will be held in the future, commonly labeled as a preference reversal.
For example, from todays perspective, the discount rate between two far-o¤ periods, t and
t + 1, is the long-term low discount rate, while from the time t perspective, the discount
rate between t and t + 1 is the short-term high discount rate. This can be modeled by the
following preference structure adapted to the purposes of our model from Laibson [58]:
Ut = Et
"
u(ct) + 
T tX
j=1
ju(ct+j)
#
When 0 <  < 1 , the above discount structure can mimic the qualitative property of
the generalized hyperbolic discount function (namely a function implying discount rates that
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decline as the discounted event moves further away in time, see e.g. Ainslie [2]), but at the
same time maintain most of the analytical tractability of the exponential discount function.
The preferences given in the above equation are dynamically inconsistent, in the sense that
preferences at date t are inconsistent with preferences at date t+ 1.7
For an equivalent statement in terms of our setting, suppose that an agent of age k has
preferences over lifetime consumption given by
Uk =
k 1X
t=1
t kB u(ct) + u(ck) + Ek
TX
t=k+1
t kF u(ct)
where B is the backward looking discount factor and F is the agents forward looking
discount factor. The above setting was considered in Imrohoroglu et al. [53] and in addition
to the Laibson e¤ect(which is achieved through the fact that 0 <  < 1) assumes (through
B > F ) the Feldstein e¤ect(Feldstein [31]) namely, that agents place less weight on the
past than they would if B = F . Both of the e¤ects will lead to regret in later periods.
Note that a major consequence of the Laibson e¤ect is that the optimal policy functions
derived at age k for ages k0 > k will no longer be optimal when the agent arrives at age k0;
and in the absence of any commitment technology, the agents future behavior will deviate
from that prescribed by the earlier policy functions.
2.2.2 Gul & Pesendorfer Self-Control Preferences
An alternative way of modelling self-control issues is a class of utility functions identied by
Gul and Pesendorfer [41]. They provide a time-consistent model that addresses the preference
reversals that motivate the time inconsistency literature.
Consider a set B of consumption lotteries, and a two-period setting. Gul and Pesendorfer
[41] have shown that under a specic assumption on choice sets (set betweenness) combined
with other standard axioms that yield the expected utility function U(:) dened as
U(B) := max
p2B
Z
(u (c) + v (c)) dp max
p2B
Z
v(c)dp
7To check this note that the MRS between periods t + 1 and t + 2 from the standpoint of the decision
maker at time t is given by u
0(ct+1)
u0(ct+2)
; which is not equal to the MRS between those same periods from the
standpoint of the decision maker at t+ 1 : u
0(ct+1)
u0(ct+2)
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represents the preference relation implied by the above axioms. The function u(:) represents
the agents ranking over alternatives when he is committed to a single choice while when he is
not committed to a single choice, his welfare is a¤ected by the temptation utility represented
by v(:). Note that when B is a singleton, the terms involving v(:) will vanish leaving only
the u(:) terms to represent preferences. However, if it is e.g., B = fc; c0g with u(c) > u(c0) an
agent will succumb to the temptation (that is, he will pick the commitment utility-reducing
alternative, c0) only if the latter provides a su¢ ciently high temptation utility v(:) in the
second period and o¤sets the fact that u(c) > u(c0), i.e., when
u(c0) + v(c0) > u(c) + v(c):
In this case the agent wishes he had only c as the available alternative, since under the
presence of c0, he cannot resist the temptation of choosing the latter.
When the above inequality is reversed, however, the agent will pick c in the second
period, albeit at a cost of v(c0) v(c):8 We call the latter di¤erence the cost of self-control.
In terms of the setting in the present paper, in every period a household faces a consump-
tion and savings problem. Each period, our agents make a decision that yields a consumption
for that period and wealth for the next. However, each period these agents face the temp-
tation to consume all of their wealth, and hence, resisting to this temptation results in a
self-control-related cost.
Under standard assumptions combined with the multi-period version of set between-
ness,we can represent self-control preferences in a recursive form for the purposes of our T
period model which is delegated to the next section.
8To see that, note that for B = fc; c0g and u(c) > u(c0) we would have that
U(fc; c0g) = max
~c2fc;c0g
(u(~c) + v(~c))  max
~c2fc;c0g
v(~c) =
= u(c) + v(c)  v(c0)
and since by assumption v(c0) > v(c) this means that
U(fc; c0g) = u(c)  [v(c0)  v(c)]
i.e. the utility of the choice c gets penalized by a positive number, the cost of self-control. Note that in
the case v(c0) < v(c) i.e. when there is congruance of the utility functions as to which alternative is the best,
there is no temptation issue anymore; c is chosen at no penalty since the v(:) terms in U(fc; c0g) cancel out.
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2.2.3 Discussion
The main di¤erence between the above models is that the model of Gul and Pesendorfer [41]
does not imply dynamic inconsistency. Preferences are perfectly consistent. Moreover, it
allows agents to exercise self-control, an option not existing in Laibson [58]. The di¤erence
in discounting was the source of preference reversals in Laibson and the explanation of
why agents nd immediate rewards tempting. Instead, Gul and Pesendorfers explanation
assumes that agents maximize a utility function that is a compromisebetween the standard
utility (or commitmentutility) and a temptationutility.9
Imrohoroglu et al. [53] considered a setting similar to ours and analyzed the consequences
of time inconsistent preferences à la Laibson, while we follow the self-control paradigm in
a similar nite-horizon setting. Gul and Pesendorfer [41] showed that for nite decision
problems a time inconsistency model à la Laibson can be re-interpreted as a temptation
model. In light of that we consider our work as an extension of Imrohoroglu et al. in that
direction.
The purpose of doing so is to check, inter alia, if our results encompass the ones of
Imrohoroglu et al. [53], or if the fact that agents in our setting are capable of exercising
self-control (an option not available in Imrohoroglu et al.), alters their ndings substantially.
2.3 A MODEL OF SOCIAL SECURITY
The model we consider in this section is quite standard in the social security literature. In
particular, our model closely follows that of Imrohoroglu et al. [53].
2.3.1 The Environment
We consider a discrete time, stationary overlapping generations economy. Each period a
new generation is born. Agents live a maximum of T periods. The population grows at a
constant rate n. All agents face a probability (st) of surviving from age t 1 to t conditional
9Gul and Pesendorfer [40, 41, 42] thoroughly compare and contrast the di¤erences and similarities between
self-control and quasi-hyperbolic preferences.
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on surviving up to age t   1: Since the economy is stationary, age t agents constitute a
fraction t of the population at any given date. The cohort shares (ftgTt=1) are given by
t+1 =
tst+1
1 + n
where their sum is normalized to 1.
2.3.2 Preferences
Agents have self-control preferences. In every period they face the temptation to consume
their entire wealth. Resisting temptation creates a self-control cost which is absent in the
models with CRRA and quasi-hyperbolic preferences. We follow Gul and Pesendorfer [41]
and DeJong and Ripoll [21] and model self-control preferences recursively. Let W (x) denote
the maximized value of the expected discounted objective function with state x. The utility
function of an agent is as follows
W (x) = max
c
fu(c) + v(c) + EW (x0)g  max
c
v(c) (2.1)
where E is the expectation operator; u(:) and v(:) are von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions; 0 <  < 1 is the discount factor; c is commitment consumption; c is tempta-
tion consumption; and x0 denotes next period state variable. As in the section above, u(:)
represents the momentary utility function and v(:) represents temptation. In particular,
v(c) max
c
v(c) denotes the disutility of choosing consumption c instead of c. The concavity
or convexity of v(:) is quite important for our analysis.10
The momentary utility and convex temptation functions take the following forms:
u(c) =
c1    1
1   (2.2)
v(c) = 
c

(2.3)
10Notice that if v(:) is convex, we need to make sure that v(:)+u(:) is stricly concave. In particular,  > 0,
 > 1 and 0 <  < =(c+1c 2) guarantee that u(:) is concave, v(:) is convex and u(:) + v(:) is strictly
concave. When v(:) is concave, one should show that W (:) is strictly concave.
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For the balanced growth rate considerations, the concave utility function is chosen as follows:
v(c) = u(c) (2.4)
In the specication above, higher values of the scale parameter ( > 0) imply an increase
in the share of the temptation utility, i.e., a higher  increases the importance of current
consumption for an agent. The momentary utility function u(:) features constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA).
2.3.3 Budget Constraints
The exogenously given mandatory retirement age is t. Agents who are younger than age t
face a stochastic employment opportunity. Agents that nd a chance to work, inelastically
supply one unit of labor.11 We denote the employment state by e 2 f0; 1g where 0 and 1
denote unemployment and employment states respectively. The employment state follows
a rst order Markov process. Transition probabilities between current employment state e
and next period employment state e0 are denoted by the 2 2 matrix (e0; e) = [k0k] where
k0; k = 0; 1 and k0k = Prfe0 = k0je = kg.
An employed agent earns wt where w denotes the wage rate in terms of the consumption
good and t denotes the e¢ ciency index of an age t agent. If an agent is at the unemployment
state, he receives unemployment insurance benet equal to the fraction of employed wage
(wt) where  is the unemployment insurance replacement ratio.
Agents retire at age t and receive a lump-sum social security benet b. The social
security benet b is dened as a fraction  of an average life time employed income, which
is independent of an agents employment history.
b =
8<: 0 for t = 1; 2; :::; t   1;Pt 1t=1 wt
t 1 for t = t
; t + 1; :::; T .
The disposable income of an agent at age t can be written as
11Adding labor-leisure choice into the model requires the modication of preferences in a way that agents
are not only tempted by current consumption but also by current leisure.
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qt =
8>>><>>>:
(1   s   u)wt for t = 1; 2; :::; t   1; if e = 1;
wt for t = 1; 2; :::; t   1; if e = 0;
b for t = t; t + 1; :::; T .
where  s and u represent the social security tax rate and the unemployment insurance tax
rate respectively.
We assume away private insurance market against the employment risk and private
annuities market against the uncertain life span.12 The only available device to smooth
consumption across ones lifetime is the accumulation of assets in terms of physical capital.
Agents cannot hold negative assets at any period.13 Since death is certain at T and there is
no bequest motive, the borrowing constraint can be stated as:148<: at  0 for t = 1; :::T   1at = 0 for t = T
If agents in this economy die before age T , their remaining assets will be distributed to
all of the survivors in a lump-sum fashion. Let  denote the equal amount of accidental
bequests distributed to all remaining members of the society:
 =
X
t
X
a
X
e
tt(a; e)(1  st+1)at(a; e) (2.5)
where (a; e) is the set of age dependent, time independent measure of agents.
12Although the annuities market exist in U.S., it is very thin (Imrohoroglu [51]). Hence, our assumption
seems innocous. In our model, social security partially fulllls the role of the missing annuities market
(it can be considered as mandotary annutization). Diamond et al. [25] analyze througly the relationship
between annuities and individual welfare. He shows that full annuitization of wealth is optimal under certain
conditions.
13In other words, an agent faces a borrowing (or liquidity) constraint. Given the size of private credit
markets, this assumption may seem not so innocous. There are two main reasons behind this assumption:
First, we would like to make careful comparision of our results with those of the existing social security
literature and this assumption is the "industry standard." Second, when agents are not allowed to borrow
against their future-income, this induces an additional boost in (private) savings for precautionary purposes,
since agents may be/remain unemployed with a positive probability. It would be a fair question to explore the
consequences of alleviating this constraint in our environment and allow borrowing against future income. In
that case however, the ability to borrow would lower agentsmarginal propensity to save (for precautionary
reasons), thus implying that the e¤ects of self-control and ability to borrow against future income are
collinear, hence the e¤ect of social security on savings due to self-control is non-identiable. In a recent
paper, Rojas and Urrita [74] show that adding endogenous borrowing constraint reduces the welfare cost of
having a social security.
14Allowing bequest motive also changes welfare implications of social security system. Fuster et al. [37]
make a welfare analysis of social security in a dynastic framework and show that steady state welfare increases
with social security.
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Hence, we can write the budget constraint of an agent as follows
at + ct = (1 + r)at 1 + qt + ; (2.6)
at + ct = (1 + r)at 1 + qt +  (2.7)
where r is the rate of return from the asset holdings.
2.3.4 Production Function
Firms have access to a constant returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas technology that produces
output (Y ) by using labor input (L = 0:94
t 1P
t=1
tt ) and capital input (K) which is rented
from households:
Y = F (K;L) = AKL(1 ) (2.8)
where A represents the state of technology;  2 (0; 1) is the capitals share of output.
Dening the capital-labor ratio as K
L
, we can write the production function in the intensive
form as follows:
y = f(k) = Ak:
The technology parameter A grows at constant rate g and capital depreciates at a constant
rate . Competitive rms in this economy maximize their prots by setting the real rate of
return from asset holdings r and the real wage rate w according to the following:
r = Ak 1   ; (2.9)
w = A(1  )k: (2.10)
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2.3.5 Government
In our setting, the governments responsibility is limited to the task of administering the
unemployment insurance and social security programs. The only constraint imposed on the
governments behavior is to enforce self-nancing of both the unemployment and social secu-
rity programs. We restrict our attention to social security arrangements that are described
by the pair (,  s). The self-nancing conditions are as follows:
 s
t 1X
t=1
X
a
tt(a; e = 1)wt =
TX
t=t
X
a
tt(a; e)b (2.11)
and
u
t 1X
t=1
X
a
tt(a; e = 1)wt =
t 1X
t=1
X
a
tt(a; e = 0)wt (2.12)
2.3.6 An Agents Dynamic Program
We suppose that the temptation function v(:) is strictly increasing, i.e., an agent is tempted
to consume his entire wealth in each period. This implies that the agent maximizes the
second part of equation (2:1) by holding zero asset for the next period, i.e., setting at = 0
in equation (2:7). In this economy, the agents state vector x contains the current asset
holdings and the employment state. Hence, we can write the agents dynamic program for
any arbitrary two period as follows
W (x) = max
c
fu(c) + v(c) + Es0W (x0)g   v((1 + r)a+ q + ) (2.13)
subject to
a0 + c = (1 + r)a+ q + , a0  0, a0 is given (2.14)
where Es0 denotes the expectation over survival probabilities.
If the agent succumbs to a temptation and consumes his entire wealth, the term v(c) 
v((1 + r)a + q + ) in the equation above cancels out. When he resists to temptation and
consumes less than his wealth, he faces a self-control cost at the amount of v(c)   v((1 +
r)a+ q+ ). The agent tries to balance his urge for current consumption v(c) and long-term
commitment utility u(c) + Es0W (x0).
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2.3.7 Steady State Equilibrium
In our characterization of the steady state equilibrium, we follow Imrohoroglu et al. [53] and
Huggett and Ventura [50].
Given a set of government policy f; ;  s; ug; a steady state recursive competitive equi-
librium is a set of value functions fWt(x)gTt=1, households policy rules fat(x)gTt=1, time
invariant measures of agents ft(x)gTt=1, wage and interest rate (w; r), and a lump sum
distribution of accidental bequests  such that all of them satisfy the following:
 Factor prices (w; r) that are derived from the rms rst order conditions satisfy the
equations (2:9) and (2:10).
 Given government policy set f; ;  s; ug, factor prices (w; r); and lump-sum transfer of
accidental bequests , an agents policy rule fat(x)gTt=1 solves the agents maximization
problem (2:13) subject to the budget constraint (2:14).
 Aggregation holds,
K =
X
t
X
a
X
e
tt(x)at 1(x) (2.15)
 The set of age-dependent, time-invariant measures of agents satises in every period t
t(x
0) =
X
e
X
(e0; e)
a:a0=at(x)
t 1(x) (2.16)
where 1 is given.
 The lump-sum distribution of accidental bequests  satises the equation (2:5).
 Both the social security system and the unemployment insurance benet program are
self-nancing i.e., satisfy the equations (2:11) and (2:12) respectively.
 The market clears
X
t
X
a
X
e
tt(x)[at(x) + ct(x)] (2.17)
= Y + (1  )
X
t
X
a
X
e
tt(x)at 1(x)
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2.4 CALIBRATION
In this section, we briey dene the parameter values of our model. Each period in our
model corresponds to a year. We closely follow Imrohoroglu et al. [53] in order to be able
to compare our results to those obtained there.
2.4.1 Demographic and Labor Market Parameters
Agents are born at a real life age of 21 (model age of 1) and they can live up to a maximum
real life age of 85 (model age of 65). The population growth rate n is assumed to be equal to
the average U.S. population growth rate between 1931-2003 which corresponds, on average, to
1:19% per year.15 The sequence of conditional survival probabilities is the same as the Social
Security Administrations sequence of survival probabilities for men in the year 2001. The
mandatory retirement age is equal to 65 (model age 45). In order to set the e¢ ciency index,
we choose the average of Hansens [43] estimation of median wage rates for males and females
for each age group. We interpolate the data by using the Spline Method and normalize the
interpolated data to average unity. The employment transition probabilities are chosen to
be compatible with the average unemployment rate in the U.S. which is approximately equal
to 0.06 between 1948 and 2003.16 The implied employment transition matrix assumes the
following form:
(e; e0) =
240:94 0:06
0:94 0:06
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2.4.2 Preference Parameters
We choose the values of preference parameters ; ;  and  in such a way that our model-
economys capital-output ratio matches that of the U.S. economy.
In the case where the temptation function v(:) is convex, we choose to follow Imrohoroglu
et al. [53] and DeJong and Ripoll [21], in letting  be centered at 2 with a standard deviation
1, i.e.,  = 2 (1). In our benchmark calibration, we initially set  = 2, and then check for
15The population data was obtained from the U. S. Census Bureau [80].
16The unemployment data are taken from the U. S. Department of Labor [79].
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the robustness of our results by letting  = 3. Holding  constant, we choose di¤erent values
of  a priori, and calculate the corresponding  in such a way that u(:)+ v(:) stays a strictly
concave function. For every triple ; ; and , we search over the values of  that deliver
the capital-output ratio which is compatible with its empirical counterpart. We assume that
the social security replacement ratio is 40% and the unemployment replacement ratio is 25%
during our search.
When the temptation function is concave, we follow DeJong and Ripoll [21] and set
 = 0:0786(0:056)
2.4.3 Production Parameters
The parameters describing the production-side of the economy are chosen to match the long-
run features of the U.S. economy. Following Imrohoroglu [52, 53], we set the capital share
of output  equal to 0:310 and the annual depreciation rate of physical capital equal to
0:069. The rate of technological progress g is assumed to be equal to 2:1%; which is the
actual average growth rate of GDP per capita taken over the time interval from 1959 to
1994 (Hugget and Ventura [50]). The technology parameter A; can be chosen freely. In our
calibration exercises, it is set equal to 1:01. All per capita quantities are assumed to grow
at a balanced growth rate g.
2.4.4 Government
We set the unemployment insurance replacement ratio () equal to 25% of the employed
wage and allow the social security replacement ratio () to vary between 0 and 1 in order
to make welfare comparisons with di¤erent replacement ratios. Alternatively, we can choose
the payroll tax rate ( s) and the unemployment insurance tax rate (u) instead of the
replacement ratios. Since the social security and the unemployment insurance benets are
self-nancing, calibrating the replacement ratios will automatically pin-down the tax rates.
This holds true because agents inelastically supply one unit of labor whenever they nd an
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opportunity to work, and changes in tax rates do not a¤ect their supply of labor.17
2.4.5 Solution Method
We use discrete-time, discrete-state optimization techniques to nd a steady-state equi-
librium of our hypothetical economy by using the aforementioned parameter values. Our
solution method designedly resembles those of previous studies.18 More precisely, we fol-
low Imrohoroglu et al. [53] in order to be able to engage in a computational method-free
evaluation/comparison of our results to theirs.
A discrete set of asset values (containing 4097 points) is created. The lower bound and
upper bound of the set is chosen in such a way that the set never binds.19 While the state
space for working age agents comprises 4097  2 points, the state space for retired agents
consists of only 4097  1 points. The discrete set of the control variable (consumption)
contains 4097  1 points. We start with a guess about the aggregate capital stock and the
level of accidental bequests and then solve agentsdynamic program by backward recursion.
The time-invariant, age-dependent distribution of agents is obtained by forward recursion.
After each loop, we calculate the new values for the accidental bequests and the capital stock.
If the di¤erence between the initial values and the new values exceed the tolerance value, we
start a new loop with the new values. This procedure continues until we nd values for the
accidental bequests and the capital stock that are su¢ ciently close to their beginning-of-loop
values.
2.5 RESULTS
There is a consensus in the literature about the adverse welfare implications of an unfunded
social security system, which are mainly due to the distortions it impinges on capital accumu-
lation and labor supply. In order to assess these welfare implications we use a compensating
17However, if we calibrate a model featuring labor-leisure choice, tax rates should be used instead of
replacement rates.
18See Imrohoroglu et al. [51, 52, 53] and Hugget and Ventura [50].
19In particular, the lower bound is equal to 0 and the upper bound is equal to 60 times greater than the
annual income of an employed agent.
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variation measure, which is dened as the percentage by which consumption must be in-
creased to compensate for the decrease in welfare generated by the presence of the social
security.
In what follows, we present the results of our calibrations starting with a particular ex-
ample where CRRA preferences (agents are immune from temptation) are used. Thereafter,
we continue our analysis by allowing agents to have self-control preferences with a convex
temptation function. Next, we proceed by conducting robustness tests and conclude this
section by displaying our results when agents feature self-control preferences with a concave
temptation function.20
2.5.1 CRRA Preferences
In our rst calibration we use CRRA preferences and calibrate our economy so as to reach
a capital-output ratio of approximately 2:5 under the assumption of a 40% social security
replacement rate. The steady state features of this economy under alternative social security
replacement rates are displayed in Table 9 ( = 0:978;  = 2;  = 0). Our ndings in this
case are congruent with those in Imrohoroglu et al. [52, 53]. Consumption, capital and
output reach their highest levels when the social security replacement rate is zero.
The main intuition is that, despite the fact that social security provides insurance against
life-time uncertainty (due to missing annuities market) and risk sharing among generations,
its negative e¤ect on capital accumulation makes it undesirable.21 Table 9 provides evidence
for that fact. It is worth noting that the level of consumption required to compensate the
consumers (depicted in the last column of the table) increases in a disproportionately manner
compared to a given increase in the social security replacement rate ().
2.5.2 Self-Control Preferences with a Convex Temptation Function
In this section we assume that agents feature self-control preferences with a convex temp-
tation function. In order to demonstrate the quantitative signicance of the temptation
20All tables of this section are delegated to the Appendix C.
21Since there is no labor-leisure decision in our model, social security system has an e¤ect only on capital
accumulation (saving).
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parameter and its economic meaning, we calculate the quantity of steady state consumption
which would be given up by an agent in order to escape from temptation. To this purpose,
following DeJong and Ripoll [21], we obtain the value x such that
u(c   x) = u(c) + v(c)  v(c)
where c is the steady-state value of the agents actual consumption and c is the steady-state
value of temptation consumption. To isolate the e¤ect of , the model is calibrated under
zero social security replacement rate and all other parameters remain xed at their CRRA
case while  is chosen equal to 2. By increasing  from 0 to 0:001, we observe that agents
would be willing to forgo as much as 4:82% of their steady state consumption in order to
eliminate temptation.22
This is an interesting result that highlights the forceful consequences of an arguably im-
perceptible departure from the CRRA preference specication. It underscores the welfare
reducing role temptation (and the induced cost of self-control) plays in our model. Nonethe-
less, at the same time it validates our main intuition, namely, that social security may not
be as detrimental to welfare as it has been generally argued in the literature.
Next our aim is to investigate whether there is any room for a social security system,
when agents have self-control preferences. In our rst calibration we use the same parameter
values for  in order to measure the impact of temptation on savings under a 40% social
security replacement rate. This example is a counter-factual in the sense that it does not
yield capital output ratio around 2:5, but it serves as a device to better demonstrate the
e¤ect of self-control preferences on savings.
Tables 10, 11 and Figures 5, 6 show the steady state of an economy with self-control
preferences under 40% replacement ratio. In particular, Table 10 is constructed holding all
parameters of the utility function xed in their CRRA values, except for ; which is the
parameter we vary. The value of parameter  measures the strength of temptation towards
current consumption. Higher values for this parameter corresponds to higher cost of exerting
self-control. We notice that all variables but the interest rate decrease as  increases (i.e. as
22DeJong and Ripoll (2006) report the analogous to their environment value as slightly above 5% of the
steady state consumption when the scale of the temptation parameter is increased from 0 to 0:00286:
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we depart from the CRRA case). In particular, the capital-output ratio decreases showing
that the increase of  triggers a process of dissavings. This process deprives the economy
from future consumption capabilities. The latter point is congruent with what we observe
in the consumption pattern as  varies.
Figure 5 illustrates the aforementioned points. We plot lifetime consumption as a function
of age. Even a casual glance suggests that an increase in the temptation intensity () results
in a abrupt departure from the consumption smoothing behavior of a CRRA agent. It
is worth noting how dramatically the early high consumption pattern of a consumer with
higher values of  gets penalized in his retirement years compared to a CRRA consumer. As
it could be expected, for a very low value of  the observed pattern closely resembles that
of CRRA.
Figure 6 provides additional support to our ndings from the perspective of lifetime
asset holdings. It is worth observing that the discrepancy in savings before retirement
between di¤erent agents (in terms of ) translates to the observed di¤erence in consumption
documented in Figure 5.
Table 11 is constructed holding , and  in their CRRA values and keeping  xed at
0:00009 under 40% social security replacement rate. Now, we only vary  which is a measure
of the consumerswillingness to substitute current temptation consumption for future one.
The higher  is the more the consumer prefers early to late temptation consumption which
actually makes the self-control cost even more severe. This, in turn causes further dissavings
and eventually lower steady state consumption for any value of .
Figure 7 illustrates our ndings in terms of lifetime consumption. The clear di¤erence in
the observed consumption pattern manifests the impact of an increase in .
Additional support is provided by Figure 8. Note that we observe that the impact of
an increase in  on asset holdings is very similar to the impact of an increase in , which
suggests that a given pattern of asset holdings is not uniquely identiable by given (; );
but instead can be induced by di¤erent combinations of those two parameters.
Now that we are able to detect the e¤ect of self-control preferences on savings, we can
calibrate our benchmark economy to analyze the e¤ect of a social security system on the
entire economy.
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Table 12 presents the features of various steady states of this economy. Our main point
in this case is that an unfunded social security system serves an additional purpose to that
of the provision of insurance against life-time uncertainty and intergenerational risk-sharing:
It makes the cost of exerting self-control less burdensome by reducing the amount of wealth
through taxing of the current income. One can speculate that if the unfunded social-security
systems negative e¤ect on savings is o¤set by its positive e¤ect on the self-control cost, a
certain level of social security replacement rate may generate larger benets (through an
increase of the level-of-capital channel) than the ones generated in the absence of social
security. This additional benet of the unfunded social security system is absent if an agent
is not endowed with temptation.
The above is indeed a challenging remark. While both social security and self control,
when considered separately, they have detrimental e¤ects on welfare, their combination yields
a noteworthy result: Welfare reduction is considerably less severe. The intuition behind this
result lies in the following fact: Social security is a mechanism that deprives agents from
early consumption. When agents face temptations, social security accomplishes at the same
time to reduce the cost associated with the exertion of self-control and consequently to
partially o¤set its adverse e¤ect on welfare. Note that this e¤ect is absent in environments
where preferences do not allow agents the option to exert self-control. Not surprisingly, it
is also absent in the case where the temptation component essentially does not modify the
consumerslifetime consumption paths.23
A careful comparison of Table 12 with Table 9 reveals that on the one hand social security
decreases welfare both under the CRRA and the self-control preference specications but on
the other, the presence of self-control preferences seems to mitigate the welfare reducing
e¤ect of social security. This can be seen by directly comparing the compensation needed by
a consumer facing temptation and the one needed by a CRRA consumer in order to o¤set
the adverse welfare e¤ects of social security. Although the scale of the temptation parameter
() is very small, the welfare cost of social security system is almost three times lower than
that of the CRRA preference specication for a given social security replacement ratio (by
comparing the last two columns of the two tables).
23See next section on "concave" temptation function.
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Our ndings parallel Imrohoroglu et al. [53] in that social security indeed entails welfare
losses both under CRRA preferences and non-CRRA preferences and it is less severe under
the latter. They used time-inconsistent (Laibson-type) preferences as their theoretical ap-
paratus and concluded that only a negligible percentage of the whole population prefers a
social security system. However, in their framework agents do not face a temptation prob-
lem (and consequently a cost of exerting self-control). Welfare issues stemming from their
preference specication reduce to a commitment problem. Hence in their case, an unfunded
social security system works only as a commitment device. Contrastingly, when consumers
face temptation, social security is considerably less costly than in the case where consumers
have CRRA preferences, precisely thanks to its additional benet of reducing the temptation
cost. This, in turn, mitigates the unfunded social security systems negative welfare e¤ect.
A rather surprising result is displayed in Table 13 ( = 1:0117;  = 2;  = 0:00065;  = 2).
The choice of a relatively large value ; results in an increase in welfare as it can be seen in
the last column. The meaning of negative values in the CV column is that there is a welfare
cost associated with smaller values of social security replacement rate. That is, agents should
be compensated for the absence of the social security system.
However, this rather controversial result is most probably due to the choice of a high 
which is necessary in order for the targeted empirical capital-output ratio to be achieved.
We by no means consider the above peculiar result as contrasting the literature. We rather
believe that it further underscores the mitigating e¤ect of the existence of a temptation
component in the utility function as it is identied in our paper.
2.5.3 Robustness Check
The purpose of this section is to test the robustness of our results to di¤erent parameter
settings. In the above calibration exercises, the risk aversion parameters  and  are taken
equal to 2. An increase in  or  results in a smaller inter-temporal elasticity of substitution.
The choice of  and  naturally a¤ects the choice of  and in turn, the choice of all three
parameters pin-down .
Note, that what may seem at a rst glance, a slight deviation from the parameter spec-
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ication used in the main section ( = 2 in Tables 12 and 13 compared to  = 3 in Table
14, as well as  = 2 in Table 12 and 13 compared to  = 3 in Table 15), has a remarkable
e¤ect on the value of , compared to its value in the benchmark case (Table 12). As  and
 increase,  essentially vanishes.
Table 14 ( = 0:999;  = 3;  = 0:00002;  = 2) shows the features of the economy
under new parameter values. It is evident that di¤erent parameter choices did not change
the conclusion we reached above regarding the welfare reducing e¤ect of social security.
However, naturally, a higher degree of risk aversion leads to greater welfare loss for a given
level of social security replacement rate.
In Table 15 ( = 0:990;  = 2;  = 0:000001;  = 3) we vary  while controlling for .
Again, our results are qualitatively similar to our benchmark calibration.
2.5.4 Self-Control Preferences with a Concave Temptation Function
In this section we consider the case of a concave temptation function. DeJong and Ripoll
[21] estimate the value of the parameter  as 0:0786 with the standard deviation 0:056.
In our calibration exercises, we set  to its estimated mean (0:0786) and extreme values
(0:0226; 0:0786). One can readily notice that these parameter values are substantially higher
than those of the convex temptation case.
Table 16 is constructed holding all parameters of the utility function xed in their CRRA
values, except for ; which is the parameter we vary. Note that contrary to the convex
temptation case, all relevant variables slightly deviate from their CRRA values. In addition,
the optimal consumption pattern produced by the concave temptation function in Figure 9
is almost identical to that of the CRRA case.
In Figure 10, we observe that the concave temptation function produces an asset holdings
pattern that sharply contrasts that observed in the convex temptation function case. The
asset holdings pattern closely matches that of the CRRA case. These ndings imply that
the functional form for temptation utility dominates the magnitude of the scale parameter
 and as a consequence, concave temptation function produces very similar results to that
of CRRA case.
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Table 17 ( = 0:984;  = 2;  = 0:0786) presents the results of the benchmark calibration
of this section. A casual comparison in the results obtained here with the ones obtained in
the previous section (Tables 9, 12, and 13) suggests that agents facing a concave temptation
function are still worse-o¤ than in an economy without social security. A more careful look
reveals the similarity between the CRRA and the concave temptation function cases in terms
of the welfare losses associated with the presence of social security. Consequently, the welfare
losses in the concave temptation function case are higher than those in the convex temptation
function case and slightly lower than CRRA case.
This result seems intuitive if one recalls that when a utility function features a concave
temptation component, the lifetime consumption and asset holding path remains essentially
invariant to deviations from the CRRA case. Therefore, social security remains equally
detrimental to welfare under self control preferences as it is under CRRA preferences.
In Table 18 ( = 0:988;  = 2;  = 0:1346), we use the highest acceptable value of .
Even in this case, our results show that the cost of social security is slightly lower than that
obtained in the CRRA case. Table 19 ( = 0:999;  = 3;  = 0:0226) is constructed for our
robustness checking purposes. It demonstrates that varying the value of the parameter 
does not change the conclusion.
2.6 CONCLUSION
Social security related expenses is one of the largest expenditure items in the U.S. govern-
ments budget. As a result, there is an extensive literature regarding social security related
issues. The costs and benets of social security are well analyzed by many authors in the
context of standard preferences: all of the studies with the exception of Imrohoroglu et al.
[53] use CRRA preferences. Imrohoroglu et al. use quasi-hyperbolic preferences instead,
and show that even in such a context where social security could be used as a commitment
device, it turns out that social security does not improve welfare.
In the present paper, we assume that consumers have self-control preferences. In our
environment, agents do not have a commitment problem but they instead face a temptation
to consume all of their available wealth at each point in time.
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Our methodology consists in implementing calibration techniques, similar to those used
in the related literature, in order to simulate our economy and draw conclusions regarding
the impact of social security on consumerslifetime welfare. In doing so, we consider several
variations of our specication of the temptation utility function (di¤erent degrees of convexity
/ concavity of the temptation function), and assess their inuence separately, while at the
same time compare it with the standard (CRRA) preferences case. Finally, we verify the
numerical validity of our results by administering various robustness tests.
Our main ndings can be summarized in the following: In a world where agents have self-
control preferences social security generally decreases lifetime welfare. Interestingly however,
we call attention to a challenging novelty which is due to our specication of self-control
preferences: The presence of temptation considerably reduces the cost of social security.
That is, indeed social security penalizes welfare but when the economy features agents with
self-control preferences the above cost is substantially mitigated.
Moreover, in our calibrations we measure that the cost of temptation, namely, the amount
of consumption that agents would be willing to relinquish in order to eliminate temptation is
as high as 4:82% of their steady state consumption. Since this percentage corresponds to an
insignicant deviation (increasing  from 0 to 0:001) from the CRRA preference specication,
it underscores the welfare reducing role temptation (and the induced cost of self-control) plays
in our model. Nonetheless, at the same time it validates our main intuition, namely, that
social security may not be as detrimental to welfare as it has been generally argued in the
literature.
While both social security and self control, when considered separately, they have detri-
mental e¤ects on welfare, their combination yields a noteworthy result: Welfare reduction
is considerably less severe. The intuition behind this result lies in the following fact: Social
security is a mechanism that deprives agents from early consumption. When agents face
temptations, social security accomplishes at the same time to reduce the cost associated
with the exertion of self-control and consequently to partially o¤set its adverse e¤ect on wel-
fare. It is worth noting that this e¤ect is absent in environments where preferences do not
allow agents the option to exert self-control or in contexts where the impact of temptation
on lifetime consumption is moderate.
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Table 2: Parameter Values of the Benchmark Calibration
Demographics
Maximum possible life span T 65
Obligatory retirement age t 45
Growth rate of population n 1:19%
Conditional survival probabilities fstgTt=1 U.S. 2001
Labor e¢ ciency prole fjgt 1t=1 Hansen [43]
Production
Capital share of GDP  0:310
Annual depreciation of capital stock  0:069
Annual per capita output growth rate g 2:1%
Markov Process for employment transition 
240:94 0:06
0:94 0:06
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Preferences
Annual discount factor of utility  0:998
Scale factor of the temptation utility  0:000375
Risk aversion parameter  2:0
Risk loving parameter  2:0
Government
Unemployment insurance replacement ratio  0:25
Social security replacement ratio  [0; 1]
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Figure 5: Optimal Consumption Choice When Temptation Function is Convex and Lambda
Varies
Figure 6: Optimal Asset Holding When Temptation Function is Convex and Lambda Varies
50
Figure 7: Optimal Consumption Choice When Temptation Function is Convex and Rho
Varies
Figure 8: Optimal Asset Holding When Temptation Function is Convex and Rho Varies
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Figure 9: Optimal Consumption Choice When Temptation Function is Concave
Figure 10: Optimal Asset Holding When Temptation Function is Concave
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3.0 OPTIMAL MULTI-OBJECT AUCTIONS WITH RISK-AVERSE
BUYERS (WITH HAD·I YEKTAS¸)
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Optimal selling mechanisms for multiple objects have been analyzed extensively due to their
theoretical and practical (e.g., the spectrum auctions, the used car auctions) importance.1
One of the main assumptions in these studies is that buyers are risk-neutral. However, when
there are many buyers and only a limited number of objects, buyers are faced with the risk
of not getting the object(s). Such a risk is costly if buyers are risk-averse.2 This is because
while risk-neutral buyersmarginal utility of income does not change, risk-averse buyers
marginal utility of income may di¤er in the events of winning and losing. Yet, the e¤ect of
this kind of risk on the design of revenue maximizing auctions for multiple objects has not
been studied, and this is the aim of the current paper.
We know from the single-object optimal auction literature that the environment with
risk-averse buyers may deliver quite di¤erent results. Hence, it is natural to expect that the
risk aversion assumption in the design of optimal multi-object auctions may provide new
insights.
In his seminal work, Myerson [67] provides the framework for designing the revenue-
maximizing auction. He shows that if a seller wishes to sell one indivisible object to one of n
1See for example, Harris and Raviv [47], Maskin and Riley [63], Levin [59], and Figueroa and Skreta [34].
2If the buyers are rms then it is more natural to assume that they are risk-averse, if the owners are
non-diversied as it is the case in most family owned companies. Moreover, if the rms have liquidity
constraints or are in a nancial distress or if the tax system is non-linear, then the rms behave as if they are
risk-averse as pointed out by Asplund [8]. He also states that the rms owned by risk-neutral shareholders
may also behave in a risk-averse manner if the control of the rm is delegated to a risk-averse manager and
his payment is linked to the rms performance.
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potential risk-neutral buyers with independently distributed private values, then it is optimal
to give the object to the buyer who has the highest virtual valuation (not the actual valuation)
that exceeds the sellers outside option.3 Thus, the standard auctions, including the "high
bid" and "English" auctions, with appropriately chosen reserve price are all optimal. He
further shows that two auctions with the same allocation rule are revenue equivalent if the
expected utility of each buyer in some benchmark case is the same, the celebrated revenue
equivalence theorem. On the other hand, once the risk-neutrality assumption is relaxed, the
standard auctions with appropriate reserve price neither generate the same expected revenue
for the seller nor are they optimal. This result arises because of the conict between the
sellers desire to insure buyers against the risk and to exploit buyersrisk-bearing to screen
them (Maskin and Riley [62]).
Moreover, if there is correlation between buyers valuations then the seller can fully
extract the informational rents using an e¢ cient auction if buyers are risk-neutral (Crémer
and McLean [18]). Yet, with risk-averse buyers the aforementioned result holds only if the
correlation is su¢ ciently strong (Es½o [30]).
With these comparisons at hand, in this paper, we aim to provide insights to answer the
following two questions:
1. How can the optimal multi-object auction with risk-averse buyers be compared to that
with risk-neutral buyers?
2. Which features of the optimal single-object auction carry over to the optimal multi-object
auction when buyers are risk-averse?
In order to answer the rst question, we build our model upon that of Armstrong [6] who
characterizes the optimal auction for multiple objects for the case of risk-neutral buyers.4
Making the analysis tractable with the assumption of binary distribution of types, he shows
3Virtual valuations are the adjusted valuations that take into account buyersinformational rents and,
more precisely, are dened as  i(vi) = vi  [1 Fi(vi)]=fi(vi); if buyer is valuation vi is distributed according
to cumulative distribution function Fi(:) with associated density function fi(:).
4Armstrong [6] inherited his setting from Armstrong and Rochet [7], who study a principal-agent problem.
Both of these papers and the current paper assume that buyers/agents have multi-dimensional private
information and, in this regard, di¤er from the references mentioned in Footnote 1.
Manelli and Vincent [60, 61] also analyze an optimal selling scheme assuming multi-dimensional private
information but di¤erent from the current paper they assume a single buyer.
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that the optimal auction assigns each object to a buyer who has high valuation for it whenever
there is such a buyer. Namely, the optimal auction is weakly e¢ cient.5 We show that this
result is robust to relaxing the assumption of risk-neutral buyers.
When the buyers are risk-neutral, depending on the correlation between their valuations
for the two objects, the optimal auction can take the form of two independent auctions, a
bundling auction, or a mixed auction.6 ;7 In contrast, if the buyers are risk-averse, we show
that, the use of two independent auctions is not optimal because the objects must be sold
to the same buyer if all buyers have low valuations for both objects.
To answer the second question, we rst need to establish that our results, which we
obtain in a binary model, are comparable with those of the current literature, which assumes
continuous distribution of types. Therefore, in Section 3.2, we characterize the optimal
single-object auction in the binary framework, imitating the work of Maskin and Riley [62].8
We then show that the outcomes assigned to each possible valuation in the binary model
resemble those assigned to the extreme values of the type space in the continuous model of
Maskin and Riley [62]. Although we do not nd new results in Section 3.2, this analogy
helps us interpret the results we obtain in Section 3.3, which describes the properties of the
revenue maximizing auctions for multiple goods. The seller perfectly insures buyers against
the risk of losing the object(s) for which they have the high(est) valuation. The buyers
who have high valuations for both objects are compensated if they can not obtain either
5Weak e¢ ciency requires that each object is sold to the buyer with the highest valuation whenever it is
sold. Some of the objects can be kept by the seller although there is a buyer who has valuation that exceeds
that of the seller. For strong e¢ ciency, on the other hand, the objects valued more highly by a buyer than
the seller must always be sold. In this sense, the optimal auctions in Myerson [67] are weakly e¢ cient.
6In all three forms, buyers have the same expected probability of winning the object(s) they have high
valuation for. These forms di¤er only in the expected probability of winning the objects for which buyers
have low valuation. In a mixed auction, a buyer who has low valuation, say, for object A but high valuation
for object B, is assigned object A more often than a buyer who has low valuation for both objects. While
independent auctions do not distinguish between these two types for object A, a bundling auction perfectly
discriminates against the type that has low valuations for both objects.
7While Armstrong [6] assumes that all buyers have demand for both objects, in Avery and Hendershott
[10], only one buyer wants both objects and the remaining buyers demand only single objects. Not surpris-
ingly, the optimal auction in the latter may not be weakly e¢ cient due to the good deal of asymmetry among
buyers. Yet, even in that case, the optimal auction bundles the objects probabilistically for the multi-demand
buyer.
8Matthews [64] studies the same problem as Maskin and Riley [62]. While the former assumes a particular
form of utility function, namely CARA, and obtains necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an auction to be
optimal, the latter consider di¤erent forms of risk aversion and characterize the properties of the optimal
auction for all of these forms.
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object. On the other hand, those who have low valuations for both objects must incur a
positive payment if they lose both objects. The intuition as follows: The seller can confront
risk-averse buyers with risk in order to screen them. There are two types of risk a buyer may
face in the optimal auction. First, his payment contingent on winning and losing may be a
random variable. Second, his marginal utility of income may di¤er when he wins and when
he loses. The rst kind of risk is absent for all type of buyers due to the CARA preference
specication.9 However, the second kind of risk is absent only for buyers who have high
valuations for the object(s). The reason is that the seller wants to prevent high-type buyers
from imitating low-type buyers. For this purpose, she confronts low-type buyers with risk by
not o¤ering insurance. This, in turn, implies that high-type buyers face with greater risk if
they behave as if they are low-type. As a result, the seller prevents high-type buyers from not
revealing their true valuations at the cost of extracting less revenue from low-type buyers.
Since the benet of preventing high-type buyers from not revealing their true valuations is
larger than the cost of not o¤ering complete insurance to low-type buyers, we observe that at
the optimum the seller o¤ers insurance to only high-type buyers. Moreover, at the optimum,
the seller rewards the highest type buyers (i.e., buyers who have high valuations for both
objects) by providing compensation but punishes the lowest type buyers (i.e., buyers who
have low valuations for both objects) by making them pay penalty when they lose the both
objects.
Finally, we comment on the solution methods used in this paper: In Section 3.2, we
describe the optimal auction in reduced form, meaning we only construct an individuals
expected probability of obtaining the object, rather than his actual probability as a function of
all buyersvalues. This technique is introduced by Matthews [64] and Maskin and Riley [62]
in order to avoid the computational complexity that risk aversion involves. Yet, additional
constraints must be imposed on the objective function in order to guarantee the existence
of the actual probabilities, that is, in order to be able to implement the reduced form
probabilities. Armstrong [6] is able to use the same method because, when buyers are risk-
neutral, only the marginal probabilities of winning the objects matter for the buyers, as well
9As long as the structure of a utility function does not allow absolute risk aversion to increase too fast with
income, the rst kind of risk is irrelevant (Maskin and Riley [62]). Since the CARA preference specication
is more tractable among others we choose this form as Matthews [64] and Es½o [30].
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as, for the seller.10
Yet, when buyers are risk-averse, the correlation between the events of winning object
A and object B matters for the buyers and consequently for the seller. In this case, the
conditions that one needs to impose in order to implement the reduced form probabilities
cannot be easily determined. Therefore, in Section 3.3, we describe the optimal auction in
the non-reduced form. That is, the actual probabilities of the events that a buyer can possibly
face are constructed as functions of the entire type prole (as reported by all participating
buyers). Since for the buyers (as well as for the seller) only expected probabilities matter,
we also make use of the reduced form probabilities throughout our analysis.11
3.2 OPTIMAL SINGLE-OBJECT AUCTIONS
3.2.1 Description of the Problem
A single indivisible object is to be sold to one of n  2 potential buyers, whose private
valuations are distributed according to a discrete random variable vi, which takes values vH
with probability H > 0 and vL with probability L > 0 such that H + L = 1: Without
loss of generality, we assume vH > vL > 0; so that vH and vL denote valuations of high-
type and low-type buyers, respectively. Buyer valuations are distributed independently and
identically. Buyers are risk-averse and have a constant measure of risk aversion (CARA).
In particular, their preferences are represented by a utility function u(!) =   e r!
r
; where
r(> 0) measures the rate of risk aversion. Note that u0(:) > 0 and u00(:) < 0. Specically, if
a buyer with valuation v wins the object and incurs a net payment of  then his utility is
u(v  ) =   e r(v )
r
: The seller is risk-neutral and her valuation for the object is zero. Both
the seller and the buyers are expected utility maximizers.
The sellers problem is to design a selling scheme that maximizes her expected revenue.12
10The number of constraints that one needs to impose to implement the reduced form probabilities increases
exponentially with the number of objects.
11In regard to the solution method, this paper is also related to Menicucci [65] which extends Armstrong
[6] by allowing for a synergy if the two goods end up in the hands of the same buyer. He shows that in this
case the optimal auction is likely to allocate the goods ine¢ ciently.
12Milgrom [66] denes an auction to be a mechanism (scheme) to allocate resources among a group of
bidders. Therefore, we will use these three terms interchangeably.
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Such a scheme most generally consists of a message set,M =M1 Mn; and an outcome
function,  : M ! ~A; that maps the list of messages, m 2 M; into a possibly random
allocation ~a 2 ~A = ~A1      ~An:13 Buyersbehavior is described by a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, s = (s1; :::; sn); where sb : b ! Mb is the equilibrium strategy of buyer b and
sb(b) represents the message that maximizes the expected utility of buyer b with type b
assuming that all buyers other than him follow the equilibrium strategy.14 Therefore, any
selling scheme in a given equilibrium results in an outcome represented by  (s1(1); :::; sn(n))
when the buyerstype prole is (1; :::; n):
Alternatively, when looking for the optimal selling scheme, we can restrict attention to
the revelation schemes in which the message space is the type space, : This is because any
allocation,  (s1(1); :::; sn(n)), resulting from an equilibrium of an arbitrary selling scheme
can also be obtained in a revelation scheme in which the outcome is determined via the
composite function  s : ! ~A and truth-telling is an equilibrium (revelation principle).15
Thus, the sellers problem can be reduced to nding the optimal revelation scheme in which
the buyers are willing to participate (individual rationality) and have incentive to truthfully
report their type (incentive compatibility).
Given a prole of reports, a selling scheme must, most generally, assign each buyer a
probability of winning, a payment in case he wins and another payment in case he loses.
That is, the outcome is determined by functions of the form  b(m) = (pb(m); ~t
w
b (m); ~t
l
b(m))
for b = 1; :::; n, where tildes represent the possibility that the payment functions are random.
Since there is only one object for sale, a feasible scheme must satisfy
Pn
b=1 pb(m1; :::;mn)  1
for all (m1; :::;mn):
Given an equilibrium, we can calculate buyer bs expected probability of winning and his
13An allocation consists of a decision about who is going to get which object(s) and possibly negative
monetary transfers from buyers to the seller.
14In this section, each type of a buyer corresponds to a possible valuation , namely j = fvH ; vLg for
all j = 1; :::; n, whereas, in the next section, there are four di¤erent types of buyers. That is, j =
fHH;HL;LH;LLg for all j = 1; :::; n; where the rst (second) letter in each type represents buyer js value
for object A (B).
15See Myerson [67].
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expected random payments in case of winning and losing, respectively, as:
b(mb) = E[pb(m) j mb] (3.1)
~wb (mb) = E[~t
w
b (m) j mb] (3.2)
~ lb(mb) = E[~t
l
b(m) j mb]: (3.3)
Since buyers are ex ante identical, only the schemes that treat them symmetrically need
to be considered. This is because, for any asymmetric scheme, we can construct a symmetric
scheme that generates the same revenue as the proposed asymmetric scheme. Symmetric
schemes satisfy the following condition:
For any b; b0 2 f1; :::; ng and any m;m0 2M;
 b(m) =  b0(m
0)
if mb = m0b0 ;mb0 = m
0
b; and for all b
00 6= b; b0 mb00 = m0b00 :
Therefore, in a symmetric scheme, the expected probability and the expected payments of
two di¤erent buyers submitting the same message are equal. Hence, we can drop the subscript
on each of the functions in (3:1) - (3:3). Describing a selling scheme from the perspective of
an arbitrary buyer, using (:); ~w(:); ~ l(:), is called reduced form representation.
Three points need to be emphasized about our approach to solving the sellers problem.
First, while using the Revelation Principle, we consider only the revelation schemes that
satisfy two sets of conditions: individually rationality and incentive compatibility. Second,
we construct the optimal auction in reduced form. We justify this by imposing another
set of conditions called implementability conditions.16 These conditions make sure that the
16Border [15] states the necessary and su¢ cient conditions, for the reduced form probabilities to be im-
plementable. We include the proposition for easy reference:
Let (S;) be a measurable space of possible types of bidders and (:) be a probability measure on S.
Dene an auction to be a measurable function p : Sn ! [0; 1]n satisfying Pni=1 pi(s)  1 for all s 2 Sn:
Dene an auction to be symmetric if pi(s) is independent of i. Given an auction, dene
i(si) =
Z
Sn 1
p(s1; :::; sn)d(s1; :; si 1;si+1;::; sn)
to be the probability that a buyer i wins when he reports his type as si:
Then  is implementable by a symmetric auction if and only if for each measurable set of types A 2 ,
the following inequality is satised:
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reduced form probability, (:); is implementable, that is, they make sure that there exists a
symmetric auction with actual allocation probabilities, p(:), which satises
(mb) = E[p(m) j mb]: (3.4)
Finally, we initially consider only the schemes in which the expected payments contingent on
winning and losing are non-random. In other words, we rst construct the optimal scheme
within the class of schemes for which ~w(:) and ~ l(:) are deterministic (hence, we drop the
tildes over ). We later establish that this scheme is also optimal among all selling schemes.
To summarize, the sellers problem is to construct the optimal revelation scheme, the
reduced form of which can be represented by six variables, fi; wi ;  ligi=H;L, where i 2 [0; 1]
denotes the probability that a buyer wins the object when he reports a valuation of vi, and
wi ; 
l
i 2 R denote the net deterministic payments that the same type of buyer incurs when
he wins and loses the object, respectively.17 As mentioned above three sets of conditions are
imposed:
If a buyer with valuation vi reports vj then his utility is equal to ju(vi   wj ) + (1  
j)u(  lj): Thus, buyers truthfully reveal their valuations if the auction satises the following
two incentive compatibility conditions:
Hu(vH   wH) + (1  H)u(  lH)  Lu(vH   wL) + (1  L)u(  lL)
Lu(vL   wL) + (1  L)u(  lL)  Hu(vL   wH) + (1  H)u(  lH):
Buyers are free to participate in the auction. Thus, participating buyers satisfy the
individual rationality conditions of the form:
Hu(vH   wH) + (1  H)u(  lH)  u(0)
Lu(vL   wL) + (1  L)u(  lL)  u(0):
Z
A
(s)d(s)  1  (A
c)n
n
Furthermore, if S is a topological space and  is a regular Borel probability on S; then  may be replaced
by either the open subsets or the closed subsets of S.
17Alternatively, as in Matthews [64], we can use the bid function (b(:) = w(:)   l(:)) and bid submission
or entry-fee function ((:)   l(:)) and search for the equivalent scheme fi; bi;  igi=H;L: The interpretation
of this scheme as follows: A buyer must pay entry-fee (:) in order to submit bid b(:): Submitting bid b(:)
gives the buyer a probability (:) of acquiring the object. In the event that the buyer acquires the object,
he makes additional payment at the amount of his bid b(:):
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Finally, the implementability conditions, stated rst in Border [15], take the following
form in our binary model:
n(LL + HH)  1 (IMfH;Lg)
nHH  1  nL (IMfHg)
nLL  1  nH : (IMfLg)
One can interpret these conditions as follows: the probability with which the object is
won by a buyer who belongs to a particular subset of the type space should be no greater
than the probability that there is a buyer who belongs to that subset. Thus, these conditions
are also called resource constraints.
The sellers revenue is the sum of the expected payments made by each buyer. Since
buyers are ex ante identical the sellers revenue can be written in terms of the expected
payments made by an arbitrary buyer (namely, the term in the bracket):
 = n[H(H
w
H + (1  H) lH) + L(LwL + (1  L) lL)]:
To sum up, the sellers problem is to choose a reduced form scheme, fi; wi ;  ligi=H;L;
that maximizes  subject to the two incentive compatibility conditions, the two individual
rationality conditions, and the three implementability conditions.
For convenience, we dene ci = e rvi and yki = e
rki . Note that, 0 < cH < cL < 1 and
yki > 0 for all i and k: So, we can rewrite the sellers problem as
max
fi;ywi ;yligi=H;L
 =
n
r
[H(H ln y
w
H + (1  H) ln ylH) + L(L ln ywL + (1  L) ln ylL)] (3.5)
subject to
HcHy
w
H + (1  H)ylH  LcHywL + (1  L)ylL (ICH)
LcLy
w
L + (1  L)ylL  HcLywH + (1  H)ylH (ICL)
HcHy
w
H + (1  H)ylH  1 (IRH)
LcLy
w
L + (1  L)ylL  1 (IRL)
n(LL + HH)  1 (IMfH;Lg)
nHH  1  nL (IMfHg)
nLL  1  nH (IMfLg)
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and the non-negativity conditions H ; L  0:
For convenience, we refer to the left-hand side of the inequality in IRH (IRL) as DH
(DL). Similarly, the right hand side of ICH (ICL) is referred to as DLH (D
H
L ). The subscripts
denote a buyers actual type, whereas the superscripts denote the type he is imitating.
All proofs of the following section are delegated to the Appendix D.
3.2.2 Solution to the Problem
Since cL > cH , ICH and IRL together imply IRH .18 Hence, this condition is redundant. For
now, we also ignore ICL when we solve the sellers problem. That is, we rst suppose that
low-type buyers do not have the incentive to misrepresent their types. Later, we show that
this is indeed the case.19 The following lemma shows that it is optimal to make high-type
buyersincentive compatibility and low-type buyersindividual rationality constraints bind.
Lemma 1. In the relaxed problem, where ICL is ignored, the constraints ICH and IRL must
be binding.
The seller may want to increase her revenue by excluding low-type buyers from the
auction if, for a given distribution of types, their valuation is small enough compared to that
of high-type buyers.20 This results in an ine¢ ciency, because with positive probability the
seller keeps the object, although all buyers value the object more highly than her. Ine¢ ciency
may also be due to a misallocation by the mechanism. To be consistent with Armstrong [6],
we focus only on the latter kind ine¢ ciency, by assuming that the goods are always sold, i.e.
L > 0.
21 In other words, we search for weakly e¢ cient auctions.
Lemma 2. At the optimum, if the low-type buyers are not excluded from the auction, then
IRH must be slack.
18DH  DLH  DL  1, where the second inequality is due to cL > cH :
19The problem that ignores the downward incentive constraints is called relaxed problem. A solution to
the relaxed problem is the solution for the full problem if it satises the ignored incentive constraints.
20Note that a monopolist solves the same problem as an auctioneer without having capacity (resource)
constraints. Hence, as in the optimal auction design, when a monopolist implements second-degree price
discrimination, it may be optimal in some circumstances not to sell the object(s) to low type-buyers.
21Clearly, high-type buyers should not be excluded from participating in the auction if revenue is maxi-
mized. That is, H must be strictly positive. If not, then the incentive conditions would imply LcL  LcH ;
and since cL > cH this in turn would imply L = 0; meaning the good is not sold, at all. Yet, the seller can
always guarantee a positive prot by posting a xed price of vL > 0:
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Now, we can write the Lagrangian to the relaxed problem as:
L =    L(DL   1)  H(DH  DLH) (3.6)
 fH;Lg(nLL + nHH   1)  fHg(nHH   1 + nL)
 fLg(nLL   1 + nH)
where L and H are the Lagrange multipliers on IRL and ICH , respectively, and fH;Lg,
fHg, and fLg are the multipliers on the implementability conditions.
Since there is a single object, a high-type buyer faces the risk of losing the object to
another high-type buyer. This creates a possibility that the marginal utility of income di¤ers
in the events of losing and winning. Hence, the seller can increase her prot and reward the
high-type buyer for revealing his true valuation by removing the risk. This implies that
the high-type buyer either does not make payment or is compensated when he loses. The
following proposition shows that, at the optimum, the seller o¤ers insurance to high-type
buyers and makes their marginal utility of income same when they lose and when they win.
Proposition 3. High-type buyers are fully insured against the risk.
If the seller does not pay information rent to a high-type buyer (wH = vH), the perfect
insurance requires that the seller sets the high-type buyers payment contingent on losing
equal to zero ( lH = 0) in order to keep him at the same level of marginal utility. However,
when there is information gap between the seller and buyers, high-type buyers should receive
information rents to be active. In this case (i.e.,wH < vH), perfect insurance requires that
the seller compensates the high type buyer ( lH > 0).
Proposition 4. High-type buyers are compensated if they lose the object.
Using Proposition 3, we can write the sellers prot as
 =
n
r
[H(H ln
1
cH
+ ln ylH) + L(L ln
ywL
ylL
+ ln ylL)] (3.7)
Note that, since 0 < cH < 1, the sellers prot is strictly increasing with respect to H . Thus,
given the values of other variables, H must be set as high as possible at the optimum. This
implies that either IMfHg or IMfH;Lg, or both are binding.
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The Kuhn-Tucker conditions with respect to ywL and y
l
L can be written as
@L
@ywL
= LL
1
ywL
  LLcL + HLcH = 0
@L
@ylL
= L(1  L)
1
ylL
  L(1  L) + H(1  L) = 0:
Since LL
1
ywL
> 0; these two equations together yield
ywL
ylL
=
L   H
LcL   HcH
: (3.8)
Note that the right-hand side of the equation (3:8) is smaller than 1
cH
: So, we have
ywL
ylL
<
1
cH
: (3.9)
This condition has the following implication: At the optimum, the iso-revenue curve must
be atter than the line corresponding to the implementability condition IMfH;Lg.22
Thus, IMfHg and IMfH;Lg are both binding and the optimal allocation probabilities can
be calculated as
H =
1 nL
nH
; L =
n 1L
n
which are the points where the iso-revenue curve is tangent to the resource constraint set
(Figure 11). Note that, nLL = 
n
L means that the probability that the object is won by a
low-type buyer is equal to the probability that all buyers are low-type. In other words, the
object is won by a high-type buyer whenever there is one. Hence, the proposition follows.
Proposition 5. The optimal auction is weakly e¢ cient.
We show that the seller insures high-type buyers. In fact, the seller can use the same
strategy and extract more revenue from low-type buyers. However, the seller prefers to
confront a low-type buyer with risk by making his marginal utility of income di¤ers in the
events of winning and losing in order to screen buyers. Hence, a high-type buyer who imitates
the low-type buyer faces greater risk and prefers to reveal his own true valuation. At the
optimum, the sellers gain from relaxing the high-type buyers incentive constraint exceeds
22This condition is equivalent to L ln(y
w
L=y
l
L)
H ln(1=cH)
< LH ; where the left hand side of the inequality is slope of
the iso-revenue curve and the right hand side is the slope of the line corresponding to the implementability
condition IMfH;Lg:
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Figure 11: Optimal Single-Object Auction
the lost due to not o¤ering insurance to the low-type buyer. As the proposition below shows
that low-type buyers are better o¤ if they obtain the object, on the contrary, high-type
buyers have the same marginal utility of income when they win and lose.
Proposition 6. Low-type buyers are better o¤ winning than losing: cLywL < y
l
L: Moreover,
in case of losing the object, low-type buyers incur a payment that is less than what they would
pay if they win: 1 < ylL < y
w
L :
Next, we show that the solution to the relaxed problem also solves the full problem where
ICL is not ignored.
Proposition 7. Low-type buyers do not have the incentive to misrepresent their type. That
is, ICL is slack.
The reduced form of the revelation scheme that weve constructed above is optimal within
the class of schemes in which the expected payments contingent on winning and losing are
deterministic. Finally, we establish that making wi and 
l
i random has a negative e¤ect on
sellers revenue.
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Proposition 8. If buyer preferences are represented by CARA, then, in an optimal auction,
the payments, wi and 
l
i; must be deterministic.
The above proposition also implies that it is not protable for the seller to condition the
payments made by a buyer on the realizations of his opponentstypes.
3.3 OPTIMAL MULTI-OBJECT AUCTIONS
3.3.1 Description of the Problem
Now, there are two non-identical objects, denoted by A and B, to be sold to n  2 buyers.
The sellers valuation for both objects is zero, whereas the buyersvaluations are random
and described by a pair (vA; vB), where vo denotes a buyers valuation for object o. Suppose
that vo 2 fvoH ; voLg, where the subscripts denote whether the buyer has high valuation (H)
or low valuation (L) for object o. Thus, we assume voH   voL > 0. There are four types of
buyer corresponding to the four possibilities (vAH ; v
B
H); (v
A
H ; v
B
L ); (v
A
L ; v
B
H) and (v
A
L ; v
B
L ): Using
a slightly shorter notation, we dene the set of possible types as  = fHH;HL;LH;LLg.
A typical element of this set is denoted with ij; where i represents a buyers valuation
for object A and j represents his valuation for object B. Types are independently and
identically distributed across buyers according to a probability measure  over , so that
the probability that a buyer is of type ij is represented by ij: The marginal probability that
a buyer who has high valuation for object A is denoted with AH = HH + HL: Similarly,
AL = LH + LL denotes the marginal probability that the buyer who has low valuation for
object A: In the same fashion, we dene BH = HH + LH and 
B
L = HL + LL to be the
marginal probabilities that the buyer has high and low valuations for object B, respectively.
Each buyer is risk-averse and has preferences represented by the common CARA utility
function of the form u(!) =   e r!
r
, where r > 0. In the event that a buyer wins object(s) of
a (total) value v and incurs a net payment  , his utility is equal to u(v ): For example, if a
buyer wins only object A when his valuation for that object is vAL and incurs a net payment
A then his utility is equal to u(vAL   A): Similarly, if a buyer of type HL wins both objects
and incurs a net payment AB then his utility is u(vAH + v
B
L   AB): Both the seller and the
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buyers are expected utility maximizers.
The sellers problem is to design a selling scheme that maximizes her revenue. In view of
the Revelation Principle, we solve this problem within the class of revelation schemes which
satisfy incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints.23 Furthermore, among
the revelation schemes, we focus only on the symmetric ones in which the buyers of the same
type are treated the same.
Let nij be the number of buyers of type ij and  = (nHH ; nHL; nLH ; nLL) be the vector
representing the prole of reports where
P
ij2 nij = n. Then, a symmetric revelation scheme
can most generally be described with two sets of rules:
 a decision rule, pkij(); that assigns each type ij 2  probabilities of realizing possible
events k = A;B;AB;O, for each prole of reports . Given ; the decision rule must
satisfy
X
ij2
nij[p
A
ij() + p
AB
ij ()]  1 (3.10)
X
ij2
nij[p
B
ij() + p
AB
ij ()]  1 (3.11)
nij[p
A
ij() + p
B
ij() + p
AB
ij () + p
O
ij()] = 1 8ij 2  (3.12)
 a payment rule, ~tkij(), that assigns each type ij 2  possibly random payments to be
made to the seller at each possible event k = A;B;AB;O, for each prole of reports .
The decision rule species with what probability a buyer b of type ij should realize vAi ,
vBj , v
A
i + v
B
j or 0. We abuse the notation and list these four events respectively as:
A - winning only object A
B - winning only object B
AB - winning both object A and object B
O - winning neither object.
23Remember that in a revelation scheme, buyers will be asked to report their types.
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As shown in Armstrong [6], the risk-neutral buyers are only interested in the marginal
probabilities of winning the objects. For risk-averse buyers, on the other hand, the correlation
between the events of winning object A and object B matters. The decision rule in the above
specication takes this into consideration.
Note that pAij()+ p
AB
ij () in (3:10) represents the marginal probability of winning object
A which we shortly denote with p^Aij(): Similarly, p
B
ij() + p
AB
ij (), in (3:11), represents the
marginal probability of obtaining object B which is denoted with p^Bij(). Thus, conditions
(3:10) and (3:11) are the resource constraints representing the fact that there is only one
unit of each object. Condition (3:12) states that the events A;B;AB and O are all inclusive.
Although the payment rule allows the seller to impose random payments, when we solve
the sellers problem, we use ~tkij() = 
k
ij where 
k
ij 2 R for all ij 2  and k = A;B;AB;O,
and characterize the optimal scheme within the class of schemes which assigns deterministic
payments. We show that imposing random payments to each type ij under each event k
cannot improve the sellers revenue.
Dene the ij-type buyers expected probability of realizing the event k = A;B;AB;O as
kij =
nX
nHH=0
n nHHX
nHL=0
n nHH nHLX
nLH=0
pkij(nHH ; nHL; nLH ; nLL)	
nij
ij
(3.13)
where	 = (n 1)!
nHH
HH 
nHL
HL 
nLH
LH 
nLL
LL
nHH !nHL!nLH !nLL!
: For any nij > 0; the variable	
nij
ij
denotes the probability
that the buyer prole is  = (nHH ; nHL; nLH ; nLL) given that there is one ij in that prole
(of course, conditional on incentive constraints hold).24
The reduced form of a symmetric revelation scheme, then, can be represented by
fAij; Bij; ABij ; Oij; Aij; Bij; ABij ; Oijgij2:
Aij and 
B
ij are type ijs expected probability of winning object A or B, alone; whereas 
AB
ij
is his probability of winning both objects. Apparently, Oij = 1   Aij   Bij   ABij represents
the probability of winning neither object.  kij is the net deterministic payment that type ij
must incur if event k occurs.
24The multinomial distribution is used.
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Then, the utility of a buyer of type ij who misrepresents his type as i0j0 is
Ai0j0u(v
A
i   Ai0j0) + Bi0j0u(vBj   Bi0j0) + ABi0j0u(vAi + vBj   ABi0j0 ) + Oi0j0u( Oi0j0):
Let coi = e
 rvoi for o = A;B and i = H;L and ykij = e
rkij for k 2 K = fA;B;AB;Og and
ij 2 : Then a scheme is individually rational if, for each type ij 2 ;
Dij  AijcAi yAij + BijcBj yBij + ABij cAi cBj yABij + OijyOij  1:
An auction is incentive compatible if, for any ij 2  and i0j0 2  n f ijg;
Dij  Ai0j0cAi yAi0j0 + Bi0j0cBj yBi0j0 + ABi0j0 cAi cBj yABi0j0 + Oi0j0yOi0j0  Di
0j0
ij :
The sellers revenue can, then, be written in terms of the expected payment of an arbitrary
buyer, namely the term in brackets:
 = n[
X
ij2
fij
X
k2K
kij
k
ijg]: (3.14)
Note that,  kij =
1
r
ln ykij: Then, if the reduced form probabilities are implementable we
can write the sellers problem in reduced form as:
max
fkij ;ykijgij2;k2K
n
r
X
ij2
fij
X
k2K
kij ln y
k
ijg (SP)
subject to
Dij  1 ij 2  (3.15)
Dij  Di0j0ij ij 2 ; i0j0 2  n fijg: (3.16)
Since the buyers are risk-averse, the correlation between the events of winning object A
(namely, event A [ AB ) and object B (namely, event B [ AB) matters for the buyers and
also for the seller through (3.14), (3.15), and (3.16). Thus, Borders [15] theorem does not
apply to this problem.25 As it is mentioned in Armstrong [6], the conditions that we need to
impose to ensure that the reduced form probabilities are implementable are not clear. For
this reason, di¤erent from the previous section, we aim to construct the actual probabilities,
25See Footnote 16.
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pkij(); 8ij 2 , k = A;B;AB and 8.26 Given a payment rule, the optimality of a decision
rule is analyzed as follows: For any modication of pkij(); we rst describe how expected
probabilities kij is a¤ected. Then, we gure out whether the incentive constraints in (3:16)
and individual rationality constraints in (3.15) hold and whether the objective function (SP )
increases after the modication. To demonstrate how this works, we borrow the following
example from Menicucci [65]:
Suppose for a given prole of reports with nHH  1 and nLH  1 each type wins object
A with probability 1
nHH
and each type LH wins object B with probability 
nLH
(0 <   1).
Note that from (3:13), this generates a contribution to BLH equal to

nLH
	
nLH
LH
:
Consider the possibility of reducing  by  > 0 while increasing the probability that the
same buyer of type HH who wins the object A also wins the object B by . Then,
BLH =  

nLH
	
nLH
LH
;
AHH =  

nHH
	
nHH
HH
=  ABHH :
So, ABHH =  AHH =   LHHHBLH : We can then evaluate the protability of reducing 
since the sellers prot function and the constraints are linear with respect to the expected
probabilities.
In the next section, we solve the sellers problem in order to nd the optimal auction.
All proofs are presented in the Appendix E.
26Given ij and , pOij() can be calculated using (3.12) once the values of p
A
ij(); p
B
ij(), and p
AB
ij () are
found.
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3.3.2 Solution to the Problem
Before we attempt to solve the problem (SP ), note that, since 0 < cH < cL, incentive
compatibility conditions imply that among the individual rationality conditions only the one
corresponding to type LL matters.
Using the same approach as in Armstrong [6], we rst solve the sellers problem con-
sidering only the ve downward incentive constraints, which ensure that a buyer does not
underreport his valuation for an object. To establish that a solution to the relaxed problem
solves the full problem, it is required to show ex post that the remaining constraints are
satised.
Thus, the seller solves:
max HHfAHH ln yAHH + BHH ln yBHH + ABHH ln yABHH + OHH ln yOHHg (SP 0)
+HLfAHL ln yAHL + BHL ln yBHL + ABHL ln yABHL + OHL ln yOHLg
+LHfALH ln yALH + BLH ln yBLH + ABLH ln yABLH + OLH ln yOLHg
+LLfALL ln yALL + BLL ln yBLL + ABLL ln yABLL + OLL ln yOLLg
subject to
ALLc
A
Ly
A
LL + 
B
LLc
B
Ly
B
LL + 
AB
LL c
A
Lc
B
Ly
AB
LL + 
O
LLy
O
LL  1 (IRLL)
ALHc
A
Ly
A
LH + 
B
LHc
B
Hy
B
LH + 
AB
LHc
A
Lc
B
Hy
AB
LH + 
O
LHy
O
LH (IC
LL
LH)
 ALLcALyALL + BLLcBHyBLL + ABLL cALcBHyABLL + OLLyOLL
AHLc
A
Hy
A
HL + 
B
HLc
B
Ly
B
HL + 
AB
HLc
A
Hc
B
Ly
AB
HL + 
O
HLy
O
HL (IC
LL
HL)
 ALLcAHyALL + BLLcBLyBLL + ABLL cAHcBLyABLL + OLLyOLL
AHHc
A
Hy
A
HH + 
B
HHc
B
Hy
B
HH + 
AB
HHc
A
Hc
B
Hy
AB
HH + 
O
HHy
O
HH (IC
LL
HH)
 ALLcAHyALL + BLLcBHyBLL + ABLL cAHcBHyABLL + OLLyOLL
AHHc
A
Hy
A
HH + 
B
HHc
B
Hy
B
HH + 
AB
HHc
A
Hc
B
Hy
AB
HH + 
O
HHy
O
HH (IC
LH
HH)
 ALHcAHyALH + BLHcBHyBLH + ABLHcAHcBHyABLH + OLHyOLH
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AHHc
A
Hy
A
HH + 
B
HHc
B
Hy
B
HH + 
AB
HHc
A
Hc
B
Hy
AB
HH + 
O
HHy
O
HH (IC
HL
HH)
 AHLcAHyAHL + BHLcBHyBHL + ABHLcAHcBHyABHL + OHLyOHL:
We rst show that it is not optimal for the seller to assign random payments and determine
which of the six constraints in the relaxed problem are binding at the optimum.
Proposition 9. If the buyers preferences are represented by CARA then, in an optimal
auction, the payments must be deterministic.
Lemma 10. At the optimum of the relaxed problem, IRLL must be binding.
Lemma 11. At the optimum of the relaxed problem, ICLLLH and IC
LL
HL must be binding.
Lemma 12. At the optimum of the relaxed problem, at least one of ICLLHH ; IC
LH
HH and IC
HL
HH
must be binding.
By using the above lemmata, we rst write the Lagrangian of the problem and derive its
Kuhn-Tucker conditions with respect to payments. Then, the relation among payments is
found by the help of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.27 Similarly to the single-object case, we
show that each buyer who has high valuation for the object(s) is perfectly insured against
not obtaining it (them). The intuition is similar to one explained in Section 3.2:28
It is clear that the seller can obtain the largest payments from buyers who have high
valuation for the object(s). If there is not a resource (capacity) constraint, the seller can
make a high-type buyers probability of obtaining the object(s) equal to one in order to
reward him for revealing his true valuation(s). However, when there is a resource constraint,
the same rewarding strategy does not work because each high-type buyer may face the risk
of losing the object(s) to another high-type buyer and hence, the marginal utility of income
may di¤er in the events of losing and winning. The resource constrained seller, however,
can reward a high-type buyer by o¤ering perfect insurance and increase her revenue. Note
that if buyers are risk-neutral, there is no insurance issue. In other words, when buyers are
27The details are presented in the Appendix E.
28In Section 3.2, we study the same problem as Matthews [64] and Maskin and Riley [62] by using the
discrete distribution of buyer valuations and hence, our results and the intuition are similar to those of
Matthews and Maskin and Riley. However, in this section we deviate from them not only due to the discrete
distribution of valuations but also due to the number of objects.
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risk-averse the seller has an additional tool to extract more revenue from buyers compared
to risk-neutral environment.
Proposition 13. Each buyer is perfectly insured against the risk of losing the object(s) for
which he has high valuation.
The proposition above states that the seller keeps a buyers marginal utility of income
at the same level for the object(s) for which he has high valuation in the events of winning
and losing. This proposition also implies that since payments made in the event of winning
cannot exceed a buyers valuation for that object, a buyer either does not make any payment
or is compensated when he loses the object(s) for which he has high valuation.
When it comes to LL-type buyers, the seller faces the following dilemma: to extract more
revenue from the LL-type buyer by o¤ering insurance and to exploit the high-type buyers
risk-bearing to screen them. At the optimum, the marginal benet of exploiting high-type
buyersrisk-bearing exceeds the marginal cost of not o¤ering insurance to LL-type buyers.
Moreover a LL-type buyer pays penalty when he loses both objects which further detects
high-type buyers from behaving as if they are LL-type.
Proposition 14. Suppose that at the optimum of the relaxed problem type LL is not excluded
from the auction. Then, he incurs a positive payment if he loses both objects.
With the help of the above propositions and lemmata, the sellers problem becomes the
following:
max[HH ^
A
HH + HL^
A
HL] ln
1
cAH
+ [HH ^
B
HH + LH ^
B
LH ] ln
1
cBH
+ HH ln y
O
HH (SP
)
+HL[^
B
HL ln y
B
HL + (1  ^BHL) ln yOHL] + LH [^ALH ln yALH + (1  ^ALH) ln yOLH ]
+LL[
A
LL ln y
A
LL + 
B
LL ln y
B
LL + 
AB
LL ln y
AB
LL + 
O
LL ln y
O
LL]
subject to
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DLL = 1
DLLLH = ^
A
LHc
A
Ly
A
LH + (1  ^ALH)yOLH
DLLHL = ^
B
HLc
B
Ly
B
HL + (1  ^BHL)yOHL
yOHH = min
8>>><>>>:
DLLHH ;
^ALHc
A
Hy
A
LH + (1  ^ALH)yOLH ;
^BHLc
B
Hy
B
HL + (1  ^BHL)yOHL:
9>>>=>>>;
where ^Aij = 
A
ij + 
AB
ij and ^
B
ij = 
B
ij + 
AB
ij :
Thus, for the optimality of an auction only the following reduced form probabilities
matter:
f^Aij; ^Bijgij=HH;HL;LH ; fkLLgk=A;B;AB:
Consider a mechanism where, for a given prole , both objects are sold with probability
one. Then, if the seller modies the mechanism by increasing pkij() by
1
nij
"kij, the following
condition must hold: X
ij2
("kij + "
AB
ij )  0 for k = A;B:
After this modication, kij increases by
1
ij
"kij	:
We now establish that the solution to the relaxed problem is weakly e¢ cient. That is, if
there is a buyer with high valuation for an object then that object is never sold to a buyer
who has low valuation for that object.
Proposition 15. Let  = (nHH ; nLH ; nHL; nLL) be the prole of the participating buyers.
Then, the solution to the relaxed problem satises the following two rules:
i) For any  with nHH + nHL > 0; nHH p^AHH() + nHLp^
A
HL() = 1
ii) For any  with nHH + nLH > 0; nHH p^BHH() + nHLp^
B
LH() = 1:
Corollary 16. At the optimum of the relaxed problem, reduced form probabilities satisfy
i) HH ^
A
HH + HL^
A
HL =
1
n
(1  (BL )n) and
ii) HH ^
B
HH + LH ^
B
LH =
1
n
(1  (AL)n):
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The next lemma establishes that both objects are sold with probability one if a buyers
payment contingent on winning an object for which he has low valuation is larger than his
payment contingent on losing the both objects.
Lemma 17. If yALH > y
O
LH ; y
B
HL > y
O
HL; and y
A
LL; y
B
LL > y
O
LL then the solution to the relaxed
problem satises the following two rules:
i) For any  with nHH + nHL = 0; nLH p^ALH() + nLLp^
A
LL() = 1
ii) For any  with nHH + nLH = 0; nHLp^BHL() + nLLp^
B
LL() = 1:
Corollary 18. At the optimum of the relaxed problem, reduced form probabilities satisfy
i) LL^
A
LL + LH ^
A
LH =
1
n
(AL)
n and
ii) LL^
B
LL + HL^
B
HL =
1
n
(BL )
n:
Since DHH = yOHH  1, when HH loses both objects he either does not pay anything
(i.e. yOHH = 1) or he is compensated (i.e. y
O
HH < 1).
Proposition 19. In any mechanism that solves the relaxed problem, if an HH type buyer
loses both objects then he is compensated.
The intuition of the above proposition is similar to that of Proposition 4. Since, at
the optimum, the seller gives up some information rent to HH-type buyers, the perfect
insurance requires the compensation for HH-type buyers when they lose both objects. This
proposition is also interesting in the following sense. When there is a single-object and the
buyer valuations are continuously distributed, the highest type is not only perfectly insured
but also compensated when he loses the object (Maskin and Riley [62]). Although our model
di¤ers both in terms of the distribution of buyer valuations and the number of objects, we
derive a similar result i.e., a buyer who has high valuation for both objects (the highest type)
is compensated when he loses both objects.
Proposition 20. In any mechanism that solves the relaxed problem, if all the buyers are of
type LL (i.e., nLL = n) then objects are bundled and each buyer wins the bundle with equal
probability (i.e., pABLL () =
1
n
).
By the above proposition, the objects A and B must be bundled to the same LL-type
buyer. In other words, it is not optimal to sell the goods separately, as in that case, with
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positive probability, the objects might end up in the hands of di¤erent LL-type buyers.
Since the seller probabilistically assesses the buyer valuations (i.e., only ex-ante proba-
bilities of the type distributions matter) and never keeps the objects by assumption, there
always exists a positive probability that LL-type buyers can obtain both objects. Therefore,
the result of the above proposition can be generalized for any type prole .
Proposition 21. Independent auctions are not optimal.
In Proposition 14, we show that the seller makes LL-type buyers pay the penalty when
they lose the both objects in order to exploit high-type buyers risk-bearings. Whenever
there exists a positive probability that LL-type buyers can receive the objects, the seller can
achieve the following two objectives by bundling the objects to one of the LL-type buyers.
First, bundling removes the possibility that one LL-type buyer receives the object A and
another LL-type buyer receives the object B. This, in turn, increases the probability that
more LL-type buyers lose both objects and hence, that the seller increases her revenue by
collecting more penalty fees (in the events of winning since the seller does not give up any
information rent to a LL-type buyer, bundling and selling the objects separately generate
the same revenue). Second, since bundling increases LL-type buyersprobability of losing
both objects, high-type buyers who imitate LL-type buyers face with even greater risk than
before. In other words, bundling enforces further the sellers objective for posing the penalty
fee.
Note that when buyers are risk-neutral, the probability of obtaining both objects is
simply the sum of the probabilities of obtaining the objects separately. Moreover, in this
environment, the seller does not assign di¤erent payments conditional on winning and losing.
Therefore, there is no issue of bundling the objects among the same type-buyers.
Lemma 22. In any mechanism that solves the relaxed problem,
i) if  is such that nLH ; nLL > 0 and nLH +nLL = n; then object A is sold to an LH type
buyer (i.e. nLH p^ALH() = 1) if
LH < (
HL
yOHL
yOHH
HH
+ 1)(
LL
yOLL
yOLH
LH
+ 1) 1  LH : (y)
Otherwise, an LL type buyer gets object A (i.e. nLLp^ALL() = 1).
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ii) if  is such that nHL; nLL > 0 and nHL + nLL = n; then object B is sold to an HL
type buyer (i.e. nHLp^BHL() = 1) if
HL < (
LH
yOLH
yOHH
HH
+ 1)(
LL
yOLL
yOHL
HL
+ 1) 1  HL: (z)
Otherwise, an LL type buyer gets object B (i.e. nLLp^BLL() = 1):
Note that, LH  1 if and only if HL  1:
According to the previous lemma, in the optimal auction, if the excess payment that LH
makes for the object A is larger than that of LL (namely, ALH   OLH > ALL   OLL), then
LH wins the object A. Similarly, if the excess excess payment that HL makes makes for the
object B is larger than that of LL (BHL   OHL > BLL   OLL), HL wins the object B.
We already establish that the seller allocates an object to a buyer who has high-valuation
for that object whenever there exists such a buyer. If there is not a high-type buyer for a
given object, the seller allocates the object A(B) to LH(HL) and LL-type buyers according
to the following three cases (see Figure 12):
 LH + HL  1 (Region A1),
 1  LH + HL  2 (Region A2),
 2  LH + HL (Region A3).
The three cases listed above are analogous to those mentioned in Lemma 2 of Armstrong
[6]: strong positive correlation, weak positive correlation, and negative correlation respec-
tively. Armstrong shows that the seller allocates the object A (B) to LH (HL) and LL-type
buyers as follows: if there is a strong correlation then the seller randomly allocates the object
A (B) to LH (HL) and LL-type buyers (independent auction), if there is a weak correlation
then the seller allocates the object A (B) to LH (HL)-type buyers (bundling auction), if the
correlation is negative then the seller uses the mixed of bundling and independent auctions
(mixed auction). Note that when buyers are risk-neutral, the seller allocates the objects
according to the strength of correlation between values for two objects. However, in our
environment, the relevant optimal payments (yOHH ; y
O
HL; y
O
LH ; y
O
LL) also a¤ect the decision of
the allocation probabilities. Given a strength of correlation, the relation between payments
make easy (or di¢ cult) to satisfy the above cases. For example, if yOHHy
O
LL > y
O
HLy
O
LH then
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Figure 12: Possible Cases
it becomes di¢ cult to satisfy the rst condition but is easy to satisfy the third condition.
Therefore, in order to nd the allocation probabilities explicitly as in the risk-neutral case,
one rst needs to nd the optimal payments. After that, by following the same methodology
as in Armstrong [6], the allocation probabilities can be explicitly characterized.
3.3.3 Discussion
When buyers are risk-averse, two major di¢ culties arise in the solution of the problem:
First, the buyers would not only be concerned about the marginal probabilities of obtaining
the objects but also about the correlation between the events of obtaining the objects A
and B together. Hence, the resource constraints of the risk-neutral case is not useful any
more. We overcome this di¢ culty by using non-reduced form probabilities and nding their
corresponding reduced-forms in our solution. Second, the number of variables to compute
is considerably higher than that of the risk-neutral case. For each possible event and each
possible type we are required to compute four allocation probabilities and their corresponding
payments which makes a total of 32 variables, compared to the 8 variables of the risk-neutral
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case. However, we were able to characterize the fundamental features of the optimal auction
under the relaxed problem. In other words, we established the necessary conditions of
the optimal multi-object auctions: In terms of the payments, we show that the features
of the single-object optimal auction is carried over to the multi-object optimal auctions
i.e., the lowest type pays penalty, the high types are perfectly insured, and the highest
type is compensated. We also establish the similarities and the di¤erences between the
characteristics of the optimal multi-object auctions with and without risk-averse buyers.
Although no bundling issue occurs among the same types in risk-neutral environment, the
seller bundles the objects to one of the LL-type buyers when the buyers are risk-averse (when
there exists a positive probability that LL-type buyers receive the objects). It is also shown
that the seller always gives the objects to a buyer who has high-valuation whenever such
a buyer exists, as in the risk-neutral case. Moreover, in the absence of a high-type buyer
for a given object, the seller allocates the object among the remaining types under similar
conditions to those of the risk-neutral environment.
3.4 CONCLUSION
In a binary model, we show that when the buyers are risk-averse, the optimal auction is
weakly e¢ cient. That is, with probability one each object is sold to a buyer who has high
valuation for it, if such a buyer exists. Each buyer is perfectly insured against the risk of
losing the object(s) for which he has high valuation. Buyers who have high valuation for
both objects are compensated if they can not win either object whereas, buyers who have low
valuation for both objects incur a positive payment if they lose both objects. The objects
are bundled when all buyers have low valuation for both objects, thus, independent auctions
are not optimal.
In a more general framework, it has been shown that among all mechanisms for allo-
cating multiple objects that are e¢ cient, incentive compatible, and individually rational,
the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism maximizes the expected revenue.29 Thus, an optimal
mechanism may not necessarily be e¢ cient. The ine¢ ciency results either because some
29For a clear and concise discussion of VCG mechanisms see Krishna [54].
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types are ex ante excluded from participating the auction, or because of a misallocation. In
this paper, we conned ourselves from the rst kind of ine¢ ciency, and showed that the lat-
ter kind of ine¢ ciency does not occur in an optimal auction. Yet, this result is very sensitive
to the assumption of binary distribution of types. Armstrong [6] shows that weak e¢ ciency
does not survive once the type space is made continuous.
The seller can exploit the risk bearing of the buyers, either by making their payments
di¤erent or assigning random payments in the events of winning and losing. While the former
improves the revenue because of the risk-aversion assumption the latter does not due to the
CARA specication.
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APPENDIX A
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
Preparation:
 Gold stars attached to the wall towards the front of the lab.
 Prepare folders with summary of instructions and record sheet (six shiny black folders
with stars on the front and six yellow manila folders).
Arrival:
 Participants are seated in the lab.
Welcome and Consent:
 Thank you for coming.
 Before we begin we will hand out a consent form.
 Please read the consent form carefully, put your initials at the bottom of the rst page
and sign it at the bottom of the second page. Your signature will indicate your willingness
to participate in the experiment.
 After you have signed the consent form we will come around to collect it.
 Collect forms.
Quiz:
 As indicated in the consent form there are two parts of this experiment.
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 First, you will be asked to answer a quiz, and then you will participate in a decision-
making experiment.
 We will start with the quiz [hand out the quiz ].
 The answers you give on this quiz will determine to which one of two groups you will
be assigned for the decision making part of the study. At the end of the experiment you
will receive$5 for having completed the quiz.
 At the top of the quiz there is a yellow post-it note with an ID number on it. This is the
number we will use to identify you in the experiment. Please remove your ID number
and put it in a safe place.
 Please go ahead and answer the quiz.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
ID Number________
Quiz
Please take a few moments to answer the quiz. If you do not know an answer please give
your best guess. When you have completed the quiz, please turn it over and we will come
around to collect it. Your score on the quiz determines to which one of two groups you will
be assigned for the decision making part of the study. At the end of the experiment you will
receive $5 for completing the quiz.
1. How many days are there in a non-leap year?
2. How many degrees Fahrenheit correspond to 0 degrees Celsius?
3. How many red stripes are there in the American ag?
4. How many days are there in the month of February during a leap year?
5. How many members are there of the U.S. Senate?
6. How many oors are there in the Cathedral of Learning?
7. What year was the University of Pittsburgh founded?
8. What are the costs of sending a one-ounce rst-class letter within the United States?
9. How many acres is the main campus of the University of Pittsburgh?
10. How many millions of dollars did the University of Pittsburgh receive in research money
from the National Institute of Health between 1995 and 2002?
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 Collect trivia quiz and hand out instructions.
 Score quiz in the back of the room-visible to the participants. The 50% who provide the
largest numerical answers to question 10 are assigned to the star-group in half of sessions
and assigned to the no-star group in the other half.
Decision-Making Experiment:
 While we score your quiz we will go over the instructions for the decision making exper-
iment. Please follow along as I read the instructions out loud.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Instructions
This is an experiment about decision making. There are twelve people in this room
participating in the experiment. Six participants will be given the role of rst-mover,
the other six will be given the role of second-mover. Your score on the quiz determines
whether you are a rst mover or a second mover. Your role will be the same throughout the
experiment.
The experiment will consist of twelve rounds. In each round, each rst-mover will be
anonymously and randomly paired with a second-mover. This will be done in such a way
that you will not be paired with the same person two rounds in a row. Nor will you be
paired with the same person more than two times. You will never know the identity of the
other person in your pair, nor will that person know your identity.
Choices and earnings
In each round you have to choose between two options: A or B. The other person in
your pair also has to choose between options A and B. Your earnings in each round will
depend on the decisions made by you and the person you are paired with for that round.
If you choose A, 100 cents are added to your earnings and 0 cents are added to the
earnings of the person with whom you are paired. Likewise, if the person you are paired
with chooses A, 100 cents are added to his or her earnings and 0 cents are added to your
earnings.
If you choose B, 75 cents are added both to your earnings and to the earnings of the
other person in your pair (irrespective of whether that person chooses A or B). Likewise, if
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the other person in your pair chooses B, 75 cents are added both to his or her earnings and
to your earnings (irrespective of whether you choose A or B).
Procedure and information
In the rst stage of a round the rst-mover will enter a choice (A or B). Then, in the
second stage, the second-mover will enter a choice (A or B). Before making his or her choice
the second-mover will be informed of the rst-movers choice.
When all the second-movers have made their choices, the result of the round will be
shown on your screen. The screen will list the choices made by you and the other person in
your pair, and the amounts earned by you and the other person in your pair. You should
then record this information on your Record Sheet.
You must not talk to the other participants or communicate with them in any way
during the experiment. If, at any stage, you have any questions raise your hand and the
experimenter will come to where you are sitting to answer them.
Quiz
To make sure everyone understands how earnings are calculated, we are going to ask
you to complete a short quiz. Once everyone has completed the quiz we will go over the
answers. If you nish the quiz early, please be patient. For each question you have to
calculate earnings in a round for you and the other person in your pair. Please raise your
hand if you have any questions.
your
earnings
others
earnings
1. You choose A and the person you are paired with chooses A?          
2. You choose A and the person you are paired with chooses B?          
3. You choose B and the person you are paired with chooses A?          
4. You choose B and the person you are paired with chooses B?          
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
 When all participants have completed the quiz go over the answers using the black board.
Assignment to groups:
 We have completed the instructions for the decision-making part of the experiment, and
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based on the results of your quiz we will now assign you to be either a rst or second
mover in the experiment.
 Those who received the high score on the quiz are assigned to what we will refer to as
the star-group. The members of the star-group will be rst movers in the experiment.
Individuals who received a low score will be assigned to the no-star-group and will be
second movers in the experiment.
 We will rst call out the ID numbers for those who received a high enough score to be
part of the star-group.
 Once you hear your ID number called please come to the front of the class.
 Once you get up here Cagri will give you a folder with a summary of the instructions
and your record sheet as well as a ribbon to congratulate you. Please wear this ribbon
for the rest of the experiment. [hand out ribbons and shinny black folders]
 Please remain standing at the front of the room until all members of the star-group have
been found.
 Call out ID numbers
 Lets give the Star-group a round of applause.
 Members of the star-group will be seated in the two front rows of the lab. If the no-
star people could please come up and get your folders with a summary and record sheet
(Cagri hand out yellow manila folders, Lise seat star-group towards front )
 If the members of the no-star-group can take a seat the last two rows. (Cagri direct
them)
 Before we begin let us summarize the rules of the experiment by reading through the
summary in your folder.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Summary
The rules of the experiment are as follows:
1. If you received a star for your performance on the quiz you are a rst mover, if you did
not receive a star you are a second mover.
2. You will be making decisions over 12 rounds. The sequence of each round is as follows:
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a. Each rst-mover is randomly paired with a second-mover.
b. The rst-mover chooses between A and B.
c. The second mover is informed of the rst movers choice, and chooses between A
and B.
d. Both the rst-mover and the second-mover are informed of the results of the round
and record them on their Record Sheet.
3. After round 12 the experiment ends and each participant is paid his or her accumulated
earnings from the twelve rounds, plus $5 for completing the quiz. Payments are done in
private and cash.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
 Point to the rst two rows "you will be the rst movers" and point to the last two rows
"you will be the second movers."
 We are ready to begin the decision-making part of the experiment. At various times
you will have to wait for others to make their decisions. When that happens please be
patient. If you have a question at any time, just raise your hand. Be sure to click OK
when you have nished reading the content on the screen.
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APPENDIX B
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Table 3: Average Contribution per Round
g1 g2 G
All rounds Star-First :552 :274 :826
Star-Second :333 :128 :461
First 6 rounds Star-First :638 :354 :992
Star-Second :437 :187 :624
Last 6 rounds Star-First :458 :194 :652
Star-Second :231 :069 :300
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Table 4: Average Earnings ($) per Round
earnings for earnings for Total
rst mover second mover earnings
All rounds Star-First 1:067 1:345 2:412
Star-Second 1:013 1:217 2:230
First 6 rounds Star-First 1:104 1:395 2:499
Star-Second 1:031 1:281 2:312
Last 6 rounds Star-First 1:031 1:295 2:326
Star-Second :994 1:154 2:148
Table 5: Conditional Probabilities (%) per Round
Pr(g2 = 1jg1 = 1) Pr(g2 = 1jg1 = 0)
All rounds Star-First 45 6
Star-Second 30 5
First 6 rounds Star-First 52 6
Star-Second 34 9
Last 6 rounds Star-First 37 6
Star-Second undetermined 2
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Table 6: Treatment E¤ects on Contributions: One-sided p-values for test that Star-
FirstStar-Second (Mann-Whitney U-test)
A: First Contribution:
All rounds 0:0143
First 6 rounds 0:0286
Last 6 rounds 0:0429
B: Second Contribution:
All rounds 0:0143
First 6 rounds 0:0143
Last 6 rounds 0:0571
C: Total Contribution:
All rounds 0:0143
First 6 rounds 0:0143
Last 6 rounds 0:0571
Table 7: Treatment E¤ects on Mimicking Behavior: One-sided p-values for test that Star-
FirstStar-Second (Mann-Whitney U-test)
Pr(g2 = 1jg1 = 1)
All rounds 0:0786
First 6 rounds 0:0571
Last 6 rounds 0:1357
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Table 8: Treatment E¤ects on Average Earnings per Round: One-sided p-values for test
that Star-FirstStar-Second (Mann-Whitney U-test)
A: Donor 1s Earnings
All rounds 0:0571
First 6 rounds 0:0571
Last 6 rounds 0:1357
B: Second Contribution:
All rounds 0:0143
First 6 rounds 0:0143
Last 6 rounds 0:0429
C: Total Contribution:
All rounds 0:0143
First 6 rounds 0:0143
Last 6 rounds 0:0571
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APPENDIX C
TABLES OF CHAPTER 2
Table 9: CRRA
 Y K C K=Y r w CV (%)
0 1.239 3.308 0.971 2.671 0.068 1.088 0.000
0:10 1.225 3.187 0.968 2.602 0.072 1.076 1.300
0:20 1.212 3.081 0.965 2.542 0.075 1.065 2.637
0:30 1.199 2.978 0.962 2.483 0.078 1.054 4.043
0:40 1.188 2.892 0.960 2.434 0.081 1.044 5.460
0:50 1.178 2.814 0.957 2.388 0.084 1.035 6.913
0:60 1.168 2.738 0.954 2.344 0.087 1.026 8.416
0:70 1.159 2.668 0.952 2.301 0.090 1.018 9.951
0:80 1.150 2.605 0.949 2.264 0.093 1.011 11.520
0:90 1.143 2.548 0.947 2.230 0.095 1.004 13.112
1 1.135 2.493 0.944 2.197 0.098 0.997 14.752
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Table 10: Counter-factual Calibration I
 Y K C K=Y r w
CRRA 1:188 2:892 0:960 2:434 0:081 1:044
 = 0:0004 1:120 2:386 0:939 2:132 0:103 0:984
 = 0:001 1:067 2:046 0:918 1:917 0:122 0:938
Table 11: Counter-factual Calibration II
 Y K C K=Y r w
CRRA 1:188 2:892 0:960 2:434 0:081 1:044
 = 2 1:168 2:735 0:954 2:342 0:087 1:026
 = 3 1:075 2:091 0:922 1:946 0:119 0:944
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Table 12: Convex Temptation Function I - Benchmark Calibration
 Y K C K=Y r w CV (%)
0 1:229 3:224 0:969 2:623 0:071 1:080 0:000
0:10 1:216 3:116 0:966 2:562 0:074 1:068 0:294
0:20 1:204 3:015 0:963 2:504 0:077 1:058 0:705
0:30 1:193 2:932 0:961 2:457 0:080 1:048 1:208
0:40 1:184 2:856 0:958 2:412 0:083 1:040 1:795
0:50 1:174 2:783 0:956 2:370 0:086 1:031 2:462
0:60 1:165 2:714 0:953 2:329 0:088 1:023 3:205
0:70 1:157 2:652 0:951 2:292 0:091 1:016 4:008
0:80 1:150 2:600 0:949 2:262 0:093 1:010 4:856
0:90 1:143 2:548 0:947 2:230 0:095 1:004 5:770
1 1:136 2:499 0:944 2:200 0:097 0:998 6:743
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Table 13: Convex Temptation Function II
 Y K C K=Y r w CV (%)
0 1:255 3:423 0:972 2:727 0:064 1:090 0
0:10 1:242 3:311 0:970 2:665 0:067 1:080  0:867
0:20 1:230 3:210 0:968 2:608 0:070 1:069  1:542
0:30 1:219 3:120 0:966 2:558 0:073 1:060  2:304
0:40 1:209 3:033 0:963 2:508 0:076 1:050  2:385
0:50 1:199 2:959 0:961 2:466 0:078 1:043  2:599
0:60 1:190 2:888 0:959 2:425 0:082 1:034  2:698
0:70 1:182 2:823 0:957 2:387 0:083 1:027  2:696
0:80 1:174 2:764 0:955 2:352 0:085 1:021  2:602
0:90 1:167 2:708 0:953 2:319 0:087 1:014  2:421
1 1:161 2:660 0:951 2:291 0:089 1:008  2:167
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Table 14: Robustness Check I
 Y K C K=Y r w CV (%)
0 1:285 3:696 0:976 2:875 0:057 1:116 0
0:10 1:261 3:475 0:973 2:755 0:062 1:096 2:905
0:20 1:239 3:289 0:970 2:652 0:067 1:077 6:084
0:30 1:220 3:125 0:966 2:560 0:072 1:060 9:500
0:40 1:202 2:981 0:962 2:478 0:077 1:045 13:12
0:50 1:186 2:854 0:958 2:405 0:082 1:031 16:89
0:60 1:172 2:744 0:954 2:341 0:086 1:018 20:81
0:70 1:158 2:640 0:950 2:280 0:090 1:006 24:93
0:80 1:145 2:550 0:946 2:225 0:094 0:995 29:15
0:90 1:133 2:464 0:942 2:173 0:098 0:985 33:59
1 1:122 2:387 0:938 2:126 0:101 0:975 38:15
101
Table 15: Robustness Check II
 Y K C K=Y r w CV (%)
0 1:264 3:508 0:974 2:774 0:062 1:099 0
0:10 1:252 3:394 0:972 2:710 0:065 1:088 0:541
0:20 1:239 3:284 0:969 2:649 0:068 1:077 1:197
0:30 1:227 3:187 0:967 2:595 0:071 1:067 1:940
0:40 1:217 3:104 0:965 2:549 0:073 1:058 2:750
0:50 1:208 3:025 0:963 2:504 0:076 1:049 3:632
0:60 1:199 2:953 0:961 2:463 0:078 1:042 4:577
0:70 1:189 2:879 0:959 2:420 0:081 1:034 5:595
0:80 1:181 2:816 0:957 2:383 0:083 1:026 6:652
0:90 1:174 2:761 0:955 2:351 0:085 1:020 7:757
1 1:167 2:707 0:953 2:319 0:087 1:014 8:916
Table 16: Counter-factual Calibration III
 Y K C K=Y r w
CRRA 1:188 2:892 0:960 2:434 0:081 1:044
 = 0:0786 1:163 2:705 0:953 2:324 0:086 1:022
 = 0:1346 1:145 2:567 0:947 2:241 0:094 1:006
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Table 17: Concave Temptation Function I
 Y K C K=Y r w CV (%)
0 1:242 3:330 0:971 2:682 0:067 1:091 0:000
0:10 1:227 3:204 0:968 2:612 0:071 1:078 1:120
0:20 1:213 3:089 0:965 2:547 0:075 1:066 2:313
0:30 1:200 2:987 0:963 2:488 0:078 1:054 3:557
0:40 1:189 2:897 0:960 2:437 0:081 1:044 4:836
0:50 1:178 2:811 0:957 2:386 0:084 1:035 6:181
0:60 1:168 2:735 0:954 2:341 0:087 1:026 7:556
0:70 1:159 2:665 0:951 2:300 0:090 1:018 8:971
0:80 1:149 2:595 0:949 2:258 0:093 1:009 10:451
0:90 1:141 2:540 0:946 2:225 0:096 1:003 11:929
1 1:133 2:481 0:943 2:189 0:098 0:995 13:483
103
Table 18: Concave Temptation Function II
 Y K C K=Y r w CV (%)
0 1.244 3.352 0.971 2.694 0.067 1.093 0.000
0:10 1.228 3.219 0.969 2.620 0.071 1.079 0.983
0:20 1.214 3.098 0.966 2.551 0.074 1.066 2.046
0:30 1.201 2.995 0.963 2.493 0.078 1.055 3.157
0:40 1.189 2.897 0.960 2.437 0.081 1.044 4.353
0:50 1.178 2.810 0.957 2.385 0.084 1.035 5.586
0:60 1.168 2.732 0.954 2.340 0.087 1.026 6.864
0:70 1.158 2.657 0.951 2.295 0.091 1.017 8.210
0:80 1.149 2.592 0.948 2.257 0.093 1.009 9.583
0:90 1.141 2.533 0.946 2.221 0.096 1.002 10.994
1 1.132 2.475 0.943 2.185 0.099 0.995 12.461
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Table 19: Robustness Check III
 Y K C K=Y r w CV (%)
0 1:267 3:560 0:975 2:809 0:061 1:113 0:000
0:10 1:244 3:348 0:971 2:692 0:067 1:092 3:371
0:20 1:223 3:171 0:968 2:593 0:072 1:074 6:937
0:30 1:204 3:017 0:963 2:506 0:077 1:058 10:700
0:40 1:187 2:877 0:959 2:425 0:082 1:042 14:702
0:50 1:171 2:758 0:955 2:355 0:086 1:029 18:792
0:60 1:157 2:649 0:951 2:290 0:091 1:016 23:078
0:70 1:144 2:555 0:947 2:235 0:095 1:005 27:455
0:80 1:131 2:462 0:943 2:178 0:099 0:993 32:107
0:90 1:119 2:384 0:939 2:130 0:103 0:983 36:804
1 1:108 2:309 0:935 2:083 0:107 0:973 41:721
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APPENDIX D
PROOFS OF SINGLE-OBJECT CASE
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose rst that IRL is slack. Then, the seller can improve her revenue
by increasing ylL by " =
1 DL
2
> 0. This would not violate any of the constraints of the relaxed
problem. So, IRL must be binding.
Suppose, next, that ICH is slack. Then, again, the mechanism can be improved prof-
itably, without violating any of the conditions considered in the relaxed problem. Namely,
increasing ylH by " =
DLH DH
2
> 0 improves the revenue: Hence, ICH is also binding.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose, by contradiction, that IRH is binding. Then, we have 1 =
DH = D
L
H = DL, where the equalities are due to IRH , ICH , and IRL, respectively. Yet, since
low-type buyers are not excluded, this would contradict with DL DLH = L(cL cH)ywL > 0:
Hence, IRH is slack.
Proof of Proposition 3. Kuhn-Tucker conditions of (3:6) with respect to ywH and y
l
H yield
@L
@ywH
= HH
1
ywH
  HHcH = 0
@L
@ylH
= H(1  H)
1
ylH
  H(1  H) = 0
These two equations imply that ylH = cHy
w
H which is equal to the following equation:
 lH + 
w
H = vH :
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Proof of Proposition 4. Remember that IRH is slack by Lemma 2. Using Proposition 3, we
can rewrite this condition as
DH = y
l
H < 1:
This is equivalent to  lH < 0; implying that, at the optimum, a high-type buyer is compen-
sated when he loses the object.
Proof of Proposition 6. Armed with the optimal values of H ; and L; we now calculate the
payments made by each type of buyer. Using ICH , IRL; and Proposition 3, we write the
payments, ywL ; y
l
L; and y
w
L ; as
ywL =
1 ylH
L(cL cH) ; y
l
L =
cLy
l
H cH
(1 L)(cL cH) ; y
w
H =
ylH
cH
where ylH is in
argmax
ylH
fn
r
[H(H ln
1
cH
+ ln ylH) + L(L ln(1  ylH) + (1  L) ln(cLylH   cH))]g:
Equivalently, ylH solves the rst-order condition of the form
H
ylH
+
H(1  L)cL
cLylH   cH
  LL
1  ylH
= 0:
This equation can be rewritten as
cL(y
l
H)
2   ylH + HcH = 0 (D.1)
where  = (1  L)(cL + HcH) + L(cH + HcL):
Since 0 < L < 1 and cH < cL,  > (cH + HcL) must be true. Then, 
2   4HcLcH >
(cH+HcL)
2 4HcLcH = (cH HcL)2  0. Thus, a solution to (D:1) exists. Furthermore,
if a buyer of type H loses the object he pays
ylH =
 +
p
2   4HcLcH
2cL
:
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Proof of Proposition 7. We have already established above that IRL and ICH are binding
and IRH is slack. We only need to show that ICL is slack. Equivalently, we need to show
that Ly
w
L < Hy
w
H :
1 Plugging in the values of ywL and y
w
H gives
1  ylH
(cL   cH) <
Hy
l
H
cH
() cH
HcL + (1  H)cH
< ylH :
We substitute in the value of ylH to get
cLcH + H [HcL + (1  H)cH ]2 < [HcL + (1  H)cH ]:
Substituting in the value of  and using IMfH;Lg yields
0 < c2LH(n  1) + c2H(1  H) + cLcH [(2  n)H   1]:
Now, we plug in the value of H and rewrite this condition as
0 < (1  nL)[c2L(n  1)  c2H + cLcH(2  n)] + (1  L)[c2Hn  cLcHn]:
Since c2Hn   cLcHn < 0; we can replace (1   L) with (1   nL) and get the following more
restrictive condition
0 < (1  nL)(n  1)(cL   cH)2;
which holds for any parameter values. Hence, ICL must be slack.
Proof of Proposition 8. Suppose that wi and 
l
i [hence y
w
i and y
l
i] are stochastic. Replacing
ywi and y
l
i with their expected values would not a¤ect any of the incentive compatibility and
individual rationality conditions (because buyersutilities are linear with respect to these
variables), but would strictly improve the sellers revenue (as revenue is concave with respect
to ywi and y
l
i), which is a contradiction.
1We add up ICH (binding) and ICL (slack).
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APPENDIX E
PROOFS OF MULTI-OBJECT CASE
Proof of Proposition 9. The same argument applies as in the proof of Proposition 8.
Proof of Lemma 10. Suppose that IRLL is slack. Then, we have
DLL  ALLcALyALL + BLLcBLyBLL + ABLL cALcBLyABLL + OLLyOLL < 1:
Since number of buyers are larger than three and since buyers are treated symmetrically,
each types probability of losing both objects is positive i.e., OLL > 0. Thus, an increase in
yOLL by "=
O
LL for " = (1  DLL)=2 > 0 strictly improves the sellers payo¤. Note that, this
modication on yOLL does not violate any of the constraints, yielding a contradiction.
Hence, IRLL must be binding.
Proof of Lemma 11. Suppose rst that ICLLLH is slack. Then, we have
DLH  ALHcALyALH + BLHcBHyBLH + ABLHcALcBHyABLH + OLHyOLH
< ALLc
A
Ly
A
LL + 
B
LLc
B
Hy
B
LL + 
AB
LL c
A
Lc
B
Hy
AB
LL + 
O
LLy
O
LL  DLLLH
Let " = (DLLLH   DLH)=2: Since OLH > 0; if we increase yOLH by "=OLH ; the sellers payo¤
improves and none of the constraints are violated. This is a contradiction. So, ICLLLH must
be binding.
Along the same lines, we can easily show that ICLLHL is binding, too.
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Proof of Lemma 12. Suppose that all three conditions are slack. Then, we have DHH <
minfDLLHH ; DLHHH ; DHLHHg: Dene " = (minfDLLHH ; DLHHH ; DHLHHg  DHH)=2: An increase in yOHH
in the amount of "=OHH improves the sellers payo¤and does not violate any of the conditions.
This is a contradiction. Therefore, at least one of these three conditions must be binding.
In order to provide the proofs of the remaining propositions and lemmata, we rst
need to write the Lagrangian of the relaxed problem (max SP 0 subject to IRLL, ICLLLH ,
ICLLHL, IC
LL
HH , IC
LH
HH , and IC
HL
HH) and nd its Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Since DHH =
minfDLLHH ; DLHHH ; DHLHHg, we can replace HH types incentive compatibility conditions with
DHH = LLD
LL
HH +LHD
LH
HH +HLD
HL
HH where LL; LH ; HL  0 and LL+LH +HL = 1
provided that ij = 0 if and only if DHH < D
ij
HH (or equivalently, ij > 0 if and only if
DHH = D
ij
HH). Hence, the Lagrangian can be written as the following:
L = HH(AHH ln yAHH + BHH ln yBHH + ABHH ln yABHH + OHH ln yOHH) + HL(AHL ln yAHL +
BHL ln y
B
HL + 
AB
HL ln y
AB
HL + 
O
HL ln y
O
HL)
+LH(
A
LH ln y
A
LH +
B
LH ln y
B
LH +
AB
LH ln y
AB
LH +
O
LH ln y
O
LH)+LL(
A
LL ln y
A
LL+
B
LL ln y
B
LL+
ABLL ln y
AB
LL + 
O
LL ln y
O
LL)
+LL(1  ALLcALyALL   BLLcBLyBLL   ABLL cALcBLyABLL   OLLyOLL)
+LH [c
A
L(
A
LLy
A
LL ALHyALH)+cBH([BLLyBLL BLHyBLH)+cALcBH(ABLL yABLL ABLHyABLH)+(OLLyOLL 
OLHy
O
LH)]
+HL[c
A
H(
A
LLy
A
LL AHLyAHL)+cBL (BLLyBLL BHLyBHL)+cAHcBL (ABLL yABLL  ABHLyABHL)+(OLLyOLL 
OHLy
O
HL)]
+HHfLL[cAH(ALLyALL AHHyAHH)+cBH(BLLyBLL BHHyBHH)+cAHcBH([ABLL yABLL  ABHHyABHH)+
(OLLy
O
LL   OHHyOHH)]
+LH [c
A
H(
A
LHy
A
LH   AHHyAHH)] + cBH(BLHyBLH   BHHyBHH) + cAHcBH(ABLHyABLH   ABHHyABHH) +
(OLHy
O
LH   OHHyOHH)]
+HL[c
A
H(
A
HLy
A
HL   AHHyAHH) + cBH(BHLyBHL   BHHyBHH) + cAHcBH(ABHLyABHL   ABHHyABHH) +
(OHLy
O
HL   OHHyOHH)]g
Since the number of buyers participating in the auction is assumed to be larger than three
and buyers of each type are treated the same in a symmetric auction, each types probability
of losing both objects is positive. That is Oij > 0 for all ij 2 S: Thus, using the four Kuhn-
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Tucker conditions ( @L
@yOHH
= OHH(
HH
yOHH
  HH) = 0; @L@yOLH = 
O
LH(
LH
yOLH
+ HHLH   LH) =
0; @L
@yOHL
= OHL(
HL
yOHL
+HHHL HL) = 0; @L@yOLL = 
O
LL(
LL
yOLL
 LL+LH+HL+HHLL) = 0)
we can solve for ijs:
HH =
HH
yOHH
HL =
HL
yOHL
+
HH
yOHH
HL
LH =
LH
yOLH
+
HH
yOHH
LH
LL =
LL
yOLL
+
LH
yOLH
+
HL
yOHL
+
HH
yOHH
:
The remaining Kuhn-Tucker conditions are of the following form:
@L
@yAHH
= AHH [
HH
yAHH
  HHcAH ] = 0;
@L
@yBHH
= BHH [
HH
yBHH
  HHcBH ] = 0;
@L
@yABHH
= ABHH [
HH
yABHH
  HHcAHcBH ] = 0;
@L
@yAHL
= AHL[
HL
yAHL
  (HL   HHHL)cAH ] = 0;
@L
@yBHL
= BHL[
HL
yBHL
  (HLcBL   HHHLcBH)] = 0;
@L
@yABHL
= ABHL[
HL
yABHL
  cAH(HLcBL   HHHLcBH)] = 0;
@L
@yALH
= ALH [
LH
yALH
  (LHcAL   HHLHcAH)] = 0;
@L
@yBLH
= BLH [
LH
yBLH
  (LH   HHLH)cBH ] = 0;
@L
@yABLH
= ABLH [
LH
yABLH
  cBH(LHcAL   HHLHcAH)] = 0;
@L
@yALL
= ALL[
LL
yALL
  cAL(LL   LH) + cAH(HL + HHLL)] = 0;
@L
@yBLL
= BLL[
LL
yBLL
  cBL (LL   HL) + cBH(LH + HHLL)] = 0;
@L
@yABLL
= ABLL [
LL
yABLL
  cAL(LLcBL   LHcBH) + cAH(HLcBL + HHLLcBH)] = 0:
By plugging the values of ijs into the above equations, we can write Kuhn-Tucker
conditions with respect to ykij for k = A;B;AB and ij 2  as:
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AHHHH [y
O
HH   yAHHcAH ] = 0 (a)
BHHHH [y
O
HH   yBHHcBH ] = 0 (b)
ABHHHH [y
O
HH   yABHHcAHcBH ] = 0 (c)
AHLHL[y
O
HL   yAHLcAH ] = 0 (d)
BHL[
HL
yBHL
  HH
yOHH
HL(c
B
L   cBH) 
HL
yOHL
cBL ] = 0 (e)
ABHL[
HL
yABHL
  cAH(
HH
yOHH
HL(c
B
L   cBH) +
HL
yOHL
cBL )] = 0 (f)
ALH [
LH
yALH
  HH
yOHH
LH(c
A
L   cAH) 
LH
yOLH
cAL ] = 0 (g)
BLHLH [y
O
LH   yBLHcBH ] = 0 (h)
ABLH [
LH
yABLH
  cBH(
HH
yOHH
LH(c
A
L   cAH) +
LH
yOLH
cAL)] = 0 (i)
ALL[
LL
yALL
  LL
yOLL
cAL   f
HL
yOHL
+
HH
yOHH
(HL + LL)g(cAL   cAH)] = 0 (j)
BLL[
LL
yBLL
  LL
yOLL
cBL   f
LH
yOLH
+
HH
yOHH
(LH + LL)g(cBL   cBH)] = 0 (k)
ABLL [
LL
yABLL
  LL
yOLL
cALc
B
L  
LH
yOLH
cAL(c
B
L   cBH) 
HL
yOHL
cBL (c
A
L   cAH)
 HH
yOHH
(cALc
B
L   LHcALcBH   HLcAHcBL   LLcAHcBH)] = 0: (l)
Proof of Propositon 13. Note that, the equations (a)-(l) are of the form kij
 = 0. We can
use them to solve for ykij for ij 2  and k = A;B;AB by implicitly assuming that kij = 0:
This is without loss of generality, because each of these ykijs appears with the corresponding
kij everywhere in the problem. Thus, if 
k
ij = 0 for a type ij and for an event k then the
value of ykij does not matter in the solution. However, if 
k
ij > 0 then 
 = 0 must be true.
Thus, equations (a)-(d) and (h) respectively yield:
yAHH =
yOHH
cAH
; yBHH =
yOHH
cBH
; yABHH =
yOHH
cAHc
B
H
;
yAHL =
yOHL
cAH
; yBLH =
yOLH
cBH
:
Similarly, the pairs (e), (f)and (g), (i)respectively give:
yABHL =
yBHL
cAH
; yABLH =
yALH
cBH
:
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These two sets of equations imply that the excess payment that a buyer makes for an
object for which he has high valuation is equal to his valuation for that object. In other
words, each buyer is perfectly insured against the risk of losing the object(s) for which he
has high valuation.
Proof of Proposition 14. Similarly, equations (e),(g),(j),(k) and (l) can be used to solve for
yBHL; y
A
LH ; y
A
LL; y
B
LL; and y
AB
LL respectively.
LH
yALH
=
LH
yOLH
cAL +
HH
yOHH
LH(c
A
L   cAH)
HL
yBHL
=
HL
yOHL
cBL +
HH
yOHH
HL(c
B
L   cBH)
LL
yALL
=
LL
yOLL
cAL +
HL
yOHL
(cAL   cAH) +
HH
yOHH
(HL + LL)(c
A
L   cAH)
LL
yBLL
=
LL
yOLL
cBL +
LH
yOLH
(cBL   cBH) +
HH
yOHH
(LH + LL)(c
B
L   cBH)
LL
yABLL
=
LL
yOLL
cALc
B
L +
LH
yOLH
cAL(c
B
L   cBH) +
HL
yOHL
cBL (c
A
L   cAH)
+
HH
yOHH
(cALc
B
L   LHcALcBH   HLcAHcBL   LLcAHcBH)
Using the last three equations, one can write
yALL =
yOLL
cAL+"1
; yBLL =
yOLL
cBL+"2
; yABLL =
yOLL
cALc
B
L+"3
for some "1; "2; "3 > 0: We plug these values into LLs individual rationality constraint to
get
yOLL(1  ALL
"1
cAL + "1
  BLL
"2
cBL + "2
  ABLL
"3
cALc
B
L + "3
) = 1:
Note that, the term in the parenthesis is less than one if LL gets either or both objects.
Thus, if OLL 6= 1 then yOLL > 1 (hence, OLL > 0) must be true.
In the following proofs we use the Lagrangian of the problem (SP) and its corresponding
constraints.
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Proof of Proposition 15. i) Let  be such that nHH +nHL > 0 and without loss of generality
assume that nHH > 0: Suppose by contradiction that nHH p^AHH() + nHLp^
A
HL() < 1: Let
"  1  nHH p^AHH()  nHLp^AHL():
There are three possibilities that we need to consider:
- nLH + nLL = 0 :
In this case, modify the mechanism by increasing pAHH() by
"
nHH
: This would increase
^AHH by 	
"
HH
. Change in the Lagrangian can be calculated as 	" ln 1
cH
> 0: This is a
contradiction.
- nLH p^ALH() > 0 :
Now, we show that decreasing p^ALH() by
"
nLH
and increasing p^AHH() by
"
nHH
is protable
for some " < nLH p^ALH(). After this modication, ^
A
LH decreases by 	
"
LH
and ^AHH increases
by 	 "
HH
:1 We calculate the change in the Lagrangian as
L = 	"fln 1
cAH
  ln y
A
LH
yOLH
+ LH [c
A
L
yALH
LH
  y
O
LH
LH
]  HHLH [cAH
yALH
LH
  y
O
LH
LH
]g
= 	" ln
yOLH
cAHy
A
LH
which is positive since yOLH > cHy
A
LH :
- nLLp^ALL() > 0 and nLH p^
A
LH() = 0 :
Suppose rst that nLLpALL() > 0: Then, decrease p
A
LL() by
"
nLL
and increase pAHH() by
"
nHH
for some " < nLLpALL(): This would decrease 
A
LL by 	
"
LL
and increase ^AHH by 	
"
HH
:
Then, the Lagrangian changes by
L = 	"fln 1
cAH
  ln y
A
LL
yOLL
+ (LL   LH)[c
A
Ly
A
LL
LL
  y
O
LL
LL
]  (HL + HHLL)[
cAHy
A
LL
LL
  y
O
LL
LL
]g
= 	" ln
yOLL
cAHy
A
LL
> 0:
Suppose now that nLLpALL() = 0: Then, nLLp
AB
LL () > 0 must be true. We show that
the following modication is protable: decrease pABLL () by
"
nLL
and increase pABHH() by
"
nHH
1 p^ALH() can be decreased either by decreasing p
A
LH() or p
AB
LH(): If the former is positive then we decrease
pALH() (and increase p
A
HH()): If the former is zero, however, p
AB
LH() should be decreased (and in response
pABHH() should be increased). In this case, marginal probabilities of winning A and B are a¤ected for both
types HH and LH. Yet, each modication has the same e¤ect on the Lagrangian.
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for some " < nLLpABLL (): This would decrease 
AB
LL by 	
"
LL
and increase ^AHH and ^
B
HH by
	 "
HH
: As a result, the Lagrangian increases by
L = 	"fln 1
cAH
+ ln
1
cBH
  ln y
AB
LL
yOLL
+ LL[
cALc
B
Ly
AB
LL
LL
  y
O
LL
LL
]
 LH [c
A
Lc
B
Hy
AB
LL
LL
  y
O
LL
LL
]  LH [c
A
Hc
B
Ly
AB
LL
LL
  y
O
LL
LL
]
 HHLL[
cAHc
B
Hy
AB
LL
LL
  y
O
LL
LL
]g
= 	" ln
yOLL
cAHc
B
Hy
AB
LL
> 0:
Thus, we conclude that if  is such that nHH + nHL > 0 then nHH p^AHH() + nHLp^
A
HL() = 1:
We can prove the part ii of the lemma along the same lines.
Proof of Corollary 16. We prove only the part i: Proof of the part ii is similar. (3:13) implies
that
HH ^
A
HH =
nX
nHH=0
n nHHX
nHL=0
n nHH nHLX
nLH=0
nHH p^
A
HH()	
HL^
A
HL =
nX
nHH=0
n nHHX
nHL=0
n nHH nHLX
nLH=0
nHLp^
A
HL()	:
Adding these two equalities and multiplying both sides with n gives
n[HH ^
A
HH + HL^
A
HL] =
nX
nHH=0
n nHHX
nHL=0
n nHH nHLX
nLH=0
[nHH p^
A
HH() + nHLp^
A
HL()]n	
=
nX
nHH=0
n nHHX
nHL=0
n nHH nHLX
nLH=0
n	 
nX
nLH=0
n!nLHLH 
n nLH
LL
nLH !(n  nLH)!
= 1  (LH + LL)n:
The second equality follows from the part i of Proposition 15.
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Proof of Lemma 17. i) Suppose the following prole: nHH + nHL = 0 and nLH p^ALH() +
nLLp^
A
LL() < 1: Let " < 1   nLH p^ALH()   nLLp^ALL(): There are two cases that we need to
consider:
- nLH > 0 : Increase p^ALH() by
"
nLH
which, in turn, increases ^ALH by 	
"
LH
: Hence, the
Lagrangian changes by
L = 	"fln y
A
LH
yOLH
+ LH [ cAL
yALH
LH
+
yOLH
LH
] + HHLH [c
A
H
yALH
LH
  y
O
LH
LH
]g
= 	" ln
yALH
yOLH
which is positive if yALH > y
O
LH or
cAL cAH
1 cAL
< LH
yOLH
yOHH
HH
1
LH
:
- nLH = 0 : A protable modication would be to increase pALL() by
"
nLL
which,in turn,
increases ALL by 	
"
LL
: Hence, the Lagrangian changes by
L = 	"fln y
A
LL
yOLL
  (LL   LH)[c
A
Ly
A
LL
LL
  y
O
LL
LL
] + (HL + HHLL)[
cAHy
A
LL
LL
  y
O
LL
LL
]g
= 	" ln
yALL
yOLL
which is positive if yALL > y
O
LL or
cAL cAH
1 cAL
< LL
yOLL
(HL
yOHL
+ HH
yOHH
(1  LH)) 1:
ii) Along the same lines of the previous part, one can easily show that this part holds if
yBHL > y
O
HL and y
B
LL > y
O
LL or if
cBL cBH
1 cBL
< minfHL
yOHL
yOHH
HH
1
HL
; LL
yOLL
(LH
yOLH
+ HH
yOHH
(1 HL)) 1g:
Proof of Corollary 18. The proof follows directly from the previous lemma and the equation
(3.13).
Proof of Proposition 19. Suppose, for now, that HH is not compensated. Then yOHH = 1:
Since cAH < c
A
L and c
B
H < c
B
L ; we have 1 = y
O
HH  DijHH  Dij  1 for ij = LL;LH;HL
where the rst inequality is due to ICijHH and the last inequality is the individual rationality
constraint. Therefore, all individual rationality constraints are binding and Dij = D
ij
HH = 1
for ij = LL;LH;HL: Moreover, since Dij  DijHH = 0; we have
ALL(c
A
L   cAH)yALL + BLL(cBL   cBH)yBLL + ABLL (cALcBL   cAHcBH)yABLL = 0;
^ALH(c
A
L   cAH)yALH = 0;
^BHL(c
B
L   cBH)yBHL = 0:
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Each term in these equations is nonnegative, therefore ALL = 
B
LL = 
AB
LL = ^
A
LH = ^
B
HL = 0
must be true. This contradicts with the previous corollary because LL^
A
LL+LH ^
A
LH > 0:
Proof of Proposition 20. Suppose, by contradiction, that for some prole  with nLL = n and
pABLL () <
1
n
: Since the both objects are sold with probability one, pALL() = p
B
LL() > 0: Let
" < 1  npABLL (): Consider modifying the mechanism by decreasing both pALL() and pBLL()
by "
n
and increasing pABLL () by
"
n
. This would imply ABLL =  ALL =  BLL = 	 "LL :
Hence, the Lagrangian changes by
L = 	" ln y
O
LLy
AB
LL
yALLy
B
LL
which is positive if yOLLy
AB
LL > y
A
LLy
B
LL or, equivalently, if
LL
yALL
LL
yBLL
>
LL
yOLL
LL
yABLL
() (LHHL + LLHHLL)(cAL   cAH)(cBL   cBH) > 0:
Since the last inequality holds for any parameter values, this modication is protable. Thus,
we conclude that if all the buyers are of type LL then the objects are bundled and each buyer
gets the bundle with equal probability.
Proof of Lemma 22. i) Suppose the following prole for  : nLH ; nLL > 0, nLH + nLL = n,
and nLH p^ALH() < 1: Since the object A is sold with probability one, p
A
LL() must be positive.
Let " < nLLpALL(): Now, consider modifying the mechanism by decreasing p
A
LL() by
"
nLL
and increasing p^ALH() by
"
nLH
: This, would decrease ^ALL by
	"
LL
and increase ^ALH by
	"
LH
:
As a result, the Lagrangian changes by
L = 	" ln y
A
LHy
O
LL
yOLHy
A
LL
:
This is positive if yALHy
O
LL > y
O
LHy
A
LL or, equivalently, if
LH
yOLH
LL
yALL
> LH
yALH
LL
yOLL
: Using the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions, we can rewrite this inequality as
(LH   HHLH)[cAL(LL   LH)  cAH(HL + HHLL)] >
(cALLH   cAHHHLH)(LL   LH   HL   HHLL):
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After some manipulation, we get
LH(HL + HHLL) > HHLH(LL   LH)
(
HL
yOHL
yOHH
HH
+ 1)(
LL
yOLL
yOLH
LH
+ 1) 1 > LH :
Proof of the part ii is similar.
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